Opinion | Could Iran End Up Becoming Trump’s Ukraine?
Opinion | Could Iran End Up Becoming Trump’s Ukraine?
US President Trump's goal of regime change in Iran seems unattainable. Tehran uses asymmetrical tactics and proxies to stretch enemy defenses, leading to a prolonged conflict.
Where is the war in the Gulf heading? The swift resolution that US President Donald Trump hoped for appears unlikely. Not because the Iranians are not on the ropes, but because Trump’s objectives appear unattainable. Trump has said that the US, with Israel, will weaken the regime in Tehran to the point that it will melt away. And if it does not, it will be so smashed that the Iranian people will take to the streets to overthrow it. In other words, regime change is the logical endpoint.
By “Trump’s Ukraine," this would mean a protracted war of attrition that is financially draining, strategically consuming, and politically difficult to exit without a visible victory.
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And it makes utter sense. Why drag the entire Gulf into a war only to leave the Mullahs in power? Letting them continue, even if they are on their knees, does not obviate the original problem. In time, they will regroup and attempt to clandestinely rebuild Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. So, regime change becomes the only desirable option.
Are Israel and the U.S. anywhere near affecting regime change in Iran? Not by a long stretch. Trump has ruled out putting boots on the ground and is instead opting for long-range precision missile strikes. But nowhere in the world has a purely aerial operation ousted entrenched authoritarians. Knowing that they cannot be yanked out of office by air power alone, the Mullahs have hunkered down. Their best bet is to wait it out and move away from direct confrontation.
Tehran is framing the conflict as a war of endurance, not immediate victory. Figures such as Ali Larijani have cast it as a test of staying power, betting that Iran can sustain 60–90 days of high-intensity confrontation and gradually shift Washington’s cost-benefit calculus. Tactically, not unlike Ukraine fighting a Goliath in the shape of Russia, Iran appears to be taking an asymmetrical, layered approach targeting enemy radar first, exhausting air defences with drones and low-cost missiles. This allows the Iranians to preserve advanced systems for later phases.
Iran is activating proxy partners gradually, pressuring energy infrastructure and maritime routes to stretch enemy defences. The tactic is creating disorder. Nearly 20% of global oil supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and even temporary disruption sends energy markets into convulsions. Energy supplies are strained. Insurance premiums spike. Investors turn cautious. Expat communities, the backbone of Gulf economies, begin to reassess their risk exposure.
It has the markings of a war of attrition. And wars of attrition rarely deliver swift political conclusions. Does another conflict without a defined end state now loom over the Gulf? A war that drains resources, tests alliances, and leaves Washington confronting the very quagmire it sought to avoid.
