Reasons for Tehran’s increased interest in the Aras Corridor

The prospects for the Aras Corridor’s competition with TRIPP and the future of Iran’s position in the South Caucasus economic corridors depend on the geopolitical developments in the region, the effective implementation and ability of regional actors to manage external pressures, and Iran’s domestic capacity in infrastructure development and corridor diplomacy.

After independence and the tensions of the 1990s, direct rail and road connections between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan region were severed. In these circumstances, Iran became the main transit route between mainland Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan, and Turkey by land.

On October 9, 2023, Tehran and Baku signed an agreement to create a transit route called the “Aras Corridor.” The route will run from Iran’s East Azerbaijan province to Nakhchivan, bypassing Armenia.

The 107-kilometer-long road and rail transit corridor begins in Kalaleh or Jolfa and continues along the border, then connects to the Republic of Azerbaijan with a bridge. About 58 kilometers of this route runs parallel to the Nakhchivan border, 47 kilometers adjacent to the Armenian border, and another 6 kilometers along the border with the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, the US attacks on bridges and logistics in Iran are also a coordinated strategy to reduce Iran’s logistical capacity and limit Iran’s role in regional corridors.

From the perspective of officials in Tehran, Iran is the only country in BRICS and West Asia that is simultaneously located on three major Eurasian transport axes, connecting them to the Persian Gulf, the Sea of ​​Oman, and the global maritime network.

Iran’s specific proposals for the establishment of a permanent corridor coordination council, the development of “green corridors” and knowledge exchange, and the integration of multi-purpose corridors indicate Tehran’s readiness to play the........

© New Eastern Outlook