The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on US–South Korea Military Cooperation: Warning Signs

We have previously analysed the reaction and the challenges that the states of the Korean Peninsula have been facing in the context of the crisis in the Greater Middle East. However, this situation is also taking its toll on cooperation between Washington and Seoul, which appears to be running into serious difficulties.

The Redeployment of US Missile Defence Systems from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East: Is Seoul in the Dark?

Aircraft tracking data reportedly indicates that several C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III strategic transport aircraft recently arrived at and departed from Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province.

The situation surrounding the THAAD system is particularly concerning. Deployed ten years ago, it triggered a serious crisis in relations between Beijing and Seoul, as China rightly believed that the system was aimed not only at North Korea. In this regard, according to Chinese media, South Korea is now questioning whether its sacrifice for the US – which led to the breakdown of its relationship with China – was justified, especially given that when the US shifts its focus, it is often unwilling to uphold its long-term commitments.

The US Department of Defence has not confirmed the specific details of the redeployment, confining itself to a general statement about the regular rotation of US troops and equipment. However, on 10 March 2026, the President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Jae Myung, issued a statement saying that the possible relocation of US military assets stationed in South Korea would not affect the level of deterrence against North Korea. Ironically, one might argue that, given that a North Korean hypersonic missile can cover the distance from Pyongyang to Seoul in just one minute, and given South Korea’s lack of appropriate air defence systems, this statement sounds somewhat unconvincing.

Such a redeployment of missiles, according to the author’s outlook, points at two important considerations. First, the pragmatists in the Trump administration are probably aware that the likelihood of the situation when North Korea carries out an attack, requiring the actual use of American missiles, is in fact close to zero. Kim Jong-un is not a character from a Hollywood action film, and the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russia provides for consultations in critical situations. This means that any drastic moves by Pyongyang would require coordination with Moscow.

A Complex Game of Interests

The question of whether US missiles will return to the Korean Peninsula after the recent incident begs many questions and illustrates the complex interplay of geopolitical interests.

On the one hand, containing China remains a key geostrategic goal for Washington. The presence of US missiles on the peninsula has traditionally been seen as an important element of that strategy. On the other hand, in light of a possible visit by Trump to China and the US administration’s desire to open a dialogue with North Korea, the withdrawal of missiles from the peninsula could be interpreted as a diplomatic gesture – a “card placed on the table” in this intricate game.

It is interesting to observe how the positions in US–South Korean relations are being altered. Previously, Democrats in South Korea actively protested against the deployment of the THAAD system and effectively hampered its effective operation. Now some of their representatives are expressing regret that the US is not taking Korea’s interests into account and is weakening its combat readiness, asking, “What if North Korea attacks and we are left deprived of missiles?”

Indeed, while the Patriot missiles do have a South Korean counterpart, there is currently no direct substitute for THAAD in Korea. This is causing concern, and conservative (and not only conservative) media are calling on the government to “work to ensure that all redeployed forces and assets are promptly brought back after completing their missions, minimising any potential gaps in deterrence against North Korea. Efforts to strengthen Korea’s own defence capabilities should also be accelerated.”

It is important to note that the possibility of redeploying US troops stems from the 2006 agreement. In that agreement, Seoul recognised Washington’s need for “strategic flexibility” and consented to US forces stationed on the peninsula being used elsewhere as part of a broader US military strategy. Notably, this agreement was concluded under President Roh Moo-hyun, who was regarded as a very progressive leader.

In this context, the opinion of Professor Lee Byong-chul from the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University is particularly interesting. He warns that a significant depletion of US interceptor missile stocks could complicate Washington’s ability to quickly reinforce the peninsula in the event of a crisis.

The Possibility of South Korean Involvement in Military Action: Debate over Trump’s Call

On 15 March 2026, in a post on his Truth Social account, US President Donald Trump expressed hope that China, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United Kingdom, and other countries would send naval vessels to the Strait of Hormuz to ensure freedom of navigation. Trump stated that the US had already “annihilated 100% of Iran’s military capability,” but that Iran remained capable of “sending one drone or another, laying a mine, or firing a short-range missile somewhere along or within that waterway, no matter how devastating a defeat they have suffered.”

Previously, Donald Trump had already called on South Korea, Japan, China, France, and the UK to join in ensuring the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the ROK took his statements seriously, despite the absence of any official request to Seoul.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun avoided giving a direct answer to the question of whether the United States had formally asked South Korea to send naval vessels to the Middle East. “It may or may not be considered a request,” he said while speaking at the National Assembly. The Ministry of Defence also confirmed that it had not received any official requests from the US regarding the deployment of warships to the Middle East.

The question of whether Trump’s social media posts constitute official statements was raised even during his first presidential term. Nevertheless, in the Republic of Korea, this has sparked active debate.

On the one hand, South Korea is already experienced in deploying its naval contingent, the Cheonghae Unit, to the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy operations. In 2020, Seoul, under pressure from Washington, decided to temporarily expand the operational area of the Cheonghae Unit to include the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand, several left-leaning lawmakers from the ruling party have emphasised that any potential US request to deploy troops or naval vessels would require parliamentary approval under the Constitution. Democratic Party lawmaker Kim Sang-wook stated that Article 5, Section 1 of the Constitution provides for the Republic of Korea’s commitment to maintaining international peace and renouncing all aggressive wars. In his view, since the current situation between the US and Iran could be considered an aggressive war, sending troops without careful consideration could be a violation of the Constitution. The floor leader of the opposition People Power Party, Kweon Seong-dong, also stressed the need to consult the National Assembly and obtain its approval regarding the dispatch of South Korean combat vessels to the Strait of Hormuz.

From the third perspective, conservative media pointed out that if South Korea were to join the proposed coalition safeguarding the Strait of Hormuz, it might wind up in a more vulnerable position than most of the US allies.

The South Korean government would find it extremely difficult to turn down a request from President Trump. A cool reception to such a demand could be extremely detrimental to the Seoul–Washington alliance, negatively affecting trade relations, including tariff issues, as well as negotiations over the cost of stationing US troops in Korea.

The situation is complicated by the fact that around 70% of South Korea’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This underscores the critical importance of ensuring a stable energy supply for the country.

However, deploying South Korean destroyers to the waters off Iran carries a high risk of attack. Taking part in US-led military operations could lead to a breakdown in relations with Iran, which in turn would jeopardise South Korea’s energy security. Furthermore, there is a risk of rising anti-war sentiment at home.

Trump’s Change of Mind

On 17 March, Donald Trump unexpectedly stated on his Truth Social page that Washington no longer needed naval assistance from its allies to resume shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. He wrote, “Since we have had such military success, we no longer need or desire the help of NATO countries – we NEVER RECEIVED it! The same goes for Japan, Australia, or South Korea.”

This statement was largely driven by the lack of active willingness on the part of the mentioned countries to assist the US. Subsequently, on 18 March, Trump specified in his account that the responsibility for ensuring the security of the Strait of Hormuz should be pinned on the countries that use that waterway.

In its dealings with the US, President Lee proceeds with the approach of his predecessor. However, on the domestic front, he needs to maintain the image of a populist defending national interests and not yielding to American demands. Nevertheless, “a new crack has appeared in the seemingly unshakeable wall.” The jury is still out on whether this crack is cosmetic or structural in nature.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences

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