Ahead of the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea: Expectations, Speculation, and Forecasts

On February 7, 2026, the 27th meeting of the Politburo of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held. It unanimously adopted a resolution to open the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in Pyongyang in the second half of February 2026.

Predictions that aren’t predictions

The upcoming congress, it seems, will not be a formal event. The previous congress was held at the very beginning of 2021, while the current one has been postponed until February. Judging by the political activity of Chairman of State Affairs Kim Jong-un, the congress will not begin until all administrative and economic projects scheduled for completion within the five-year plan are ceremoniously launched. Then the congress will truly be able to seriously take stock of what has been accomplished.

Domestic Political Context: Congress of the Victors

In this context, some Russian political scientists, including the author, expect the congress to be somewhat more open in terms of open discussion of problems. Generally, such events are already held quite openly, but a number of Kim Jong-un’s recent speeches indicate that topics previously discussed in private are now being aired publicly. Kim speaks calmly about structural problems and may even suggest live on air that the Deputy Prime Minister “resign of his own accord.” Therefore, it is quite likely that the level of discussion at the next congress will also increase.

What’s important here is this: this isn’t about transparency for the sake of transparency. Apparently, North Korea has indeed successfully accomplished the vast majority of its assigned tasks, and this allows Kim Jong-un, on the one hand, to honestly declare victory, and on the other, to conduct a major debriefing devoted to the shortcomings that emerged during this process and how they should be overcome.

Personnel and Ideological Changes

In this context, the author expects great things from the congress, specifically in terms of internal work with party members. In his speeches in 2024–2025, Kim Jong-un spoke extensively about the need for the party elite to behave more responsibly, not to fear difficulties, and not to be held captive by formulaic solutions that no longer work in a changing reality. Therefore, it’s highly likely that the discussion will involve not only general phrases about party discipline, but also a serious overhaul of the party charter and organization, possibly even involving specific personnel decisions. Economic Development and Military Development.

Regarding the economy, the author feels that the government will continue to focus on improving the quality of life for ordinary citizens both in the capital and beyond, as part of the “20×10 Periphery Development Policy” regional development program announced by the Workers’ Party of Korea in early 2024. Fortunately, according to estimates by Lee Jeong-gyu, a senior research fellow at the Korea Development Institute (KDI) based on Bank of Korea data, the overall growth rate of the DPRK economy during the implementation of the 5-Year Economic Development Plan (2021-2025) announced at the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2021 was 9.9%, despite challenges associated with tightening international economic sanctions and quarantine restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the area of ​​military development, according to South Korean experts, Pyongyang intends to formalize a course toward the parallel development of nuclear and conventional forces. While the focus has previously been on the nuclear shield and its delivery systems, conventional weapons (including UAVs) will also be developed, with a focus on learning from the experiences of modern military conflicts. However, according to Shin Seung-gi, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Studies (KIDA), missiles won’t be completely forgotten either: the Hwasong-20 ICBM will be actively developed.

Foreign Policy: Two States and Relations with Russia

Regarding foreign policy, South Korean authors naturally assume that South Korea will be officially designated the main enemy. However, the author is far more concerned with what the party charter or constitution will say regarding the country’s borders. Perhaps North Korea will nevertheless point out that the DPRK’s territory does not extend to the entire peninsula and that South Korea is a separate, hostile state. Currently, the North demonstratively ignores the existence of South Korea and has abandoned the unification paradigm, which is the basis for the “Second Korean War” concept favored by the South’s right.

Regarding policy toward the United States, there is ongoing debate, but while the West believes that North Korea will seek negotiations with the US to enhance its diplomatic status, Russia is more critical of this possibility. Because, firstly, North Korea’s own negotiating position has greatly increased; secondly, previous experience has clearly demonstrated that, despite the relatively warm personal relationship between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump, this has no impact on interstate ties. And even if Trump were to take a step toward Kim, his entourage and the deep state would not allow him to do so.

Georgy Toloraya, Chief Researcher at the Institute of Socio-Economics and Seminars of the Russian Academy of Sciences, predicts that North Korea’s new foreign policy concept will look like this:

North Korea no longer asks for recognition from the West; it demands it as “not a besieged fortress, but a confident nuclear power” and a full-fledged participant in the “new multipolar world.”

The alliance with Moscow is presented as an equal alliance of two great powers, who are jointly rewriting the global rules of the game in the struggle against the unipolar world of the United States.

The final rejection of any idea of ​​peaceful unification and a transition to a format of relations between “two sovereign warring parties.”

Western Speculation: Daughter Successor, “Un-ism,” and Title Changes

However, Western and South Korean political scientists are fantasizing less about actual intra-party changes than about the image of a “totalitarian Mordor.” It is in this context that the author interprets the numerous rumors that the “favorite daughter,” who indeed often appears with her father at military and political events (and therefore could very well be among the congress guests), will be declared the official successor. South Korean intelligence, which enjoys playing the game of “guess what the bosses want to hear and tell them the story,” has already made this assumption.

This also includes speculation that “the congress will most likely strengthen the personalist course and further formalize ‘Kimjong-unism’ as a special doctrine within the Juche system.”

It is worth noting G. Tolorai’s thoughts that we are in for a “transition from guerrilla-revolutionary romanticism to the attributes of a regular, powerful state.” Kim is actively investing in the development of institutions, and, using Max Weber’s typology, the DPRK is moving from a charismatic model of government to an institutional one.

Slightly more interesting is the notion that Kim Jong-un could inherit the title of president of the country. Formally, Kim Il-sung was considered the eternal president, and this position was reserved for him. However, at one time, the position of party general secretary was similarly reserved for Kim Jong-il, and the country had an eternal president and eternal general secretary. But five years ago, Kim Jong-un became general secretary of the WPK, and the possibility of a change in the title of the leader cannot be ruled out.

In lieu of a conclusion

After the congress is over, the author will devote a detailed review to it, but these expectations deserve a separate text, if only because they create some insight into the predictive abilities of various academic schools and political orientations. We will see what comes to pass.

Just as the previous congress outlined the direction of the country’s movement, which was generally achieved, the new congress opens up prospects for a new five-year plan, and the author, like the North Korean leadership, is optimistic in this regard.

Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D. in History, Leading Researcher at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences

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