Trump defined victory by redefining “unconditional surrender” to mean his assessment of whether we’ve destroyed Iran’s navy, its ability to project power. It seems possible to me that such conditions exist now.

Bibi Netanyahu has also recently redefined victory to bring it closer within reach. While he seemed more committed to the war having an outcome of regime destruction, he now seems to admit that air power can achieve only so much, and that his goal was to achieve “optimal conditions” that are possible for an internally led regime change, given the limits of air power.

The mission after victory would be about effecting a final disruption in the Iranian military supply chain that helped them rebuild so quickly after the Fordow strikes. Only then can we say with more confidence that we’re not assigning ourselves a very ugly seasonal chore in the Middle East.

But the question remains: Can the U.S. reopen the Strait of Hormuz? Iran hasn’t had to deploy its speed attack boat swarm, it simply had to announce a credible threat to use projectiles and drones — and at that point the insurance companies stepped in and the Strait was closed without Iran firing a shot.

NATO is in talks about the best way to reopen it. And if the Strait does not reopen soon, does that cut against the credibility of the United States and Israel declaring victory? Does Iran look like a winner, simply by not losing? Can Iran still look like a winner if, having kept the Strait closed beyond active military measures of Israel and the U.S., it simply reopens because of global diplomatic pressure? I think any situation in which Iran seems like an active pest, or likely to become an imminent threat again in the near term, will strike even most of the war’s supporters as a failure.

© National Review