The day after the bombs: The strategic void of US intervention in Iran
It seems that in his second presidential term, Donald Trump is still severely suffering from the same problem he had eight years ago; he fundamentally does not understand Iran. Evidently, Trump lacks a clear understanding of Iran’s geopolitical and identity-based complexities, which has now brought him to the brink of one of his most perilous foreign policy decisions: issuing the order for war. While the prospect of a prolonged aerial bombing campaign still appears alluring to American politicians, the new paradigm of intervention—namely, what recently unfolded in Venezuela—has given Washington a dangerous surge of overconfidence; a miscalculation that could ultimately culminate in a full-scale catastrophe in the Middle East. Iran is not Libya, nor Iraq, nor Venezuela; and attempting to impose the blueprint of any of these countries onto Tehran will ultimately chart a dark and turbulent path for the region’s future. However, the critical analytical question remains: why is Iran, contrary to the assumptions of American strategists, a fundamentally different society and identity?
Unlike many countries in the Middle East, Iran is the heir to an empire; a country that cannot be adequately explained within the conventional framework of a “nation-state”, but rather through the more foundational concept of a “civilisational state.” The historical memory of Iranian citizens is fraught with a sense of insecurity stemming from foreign invasions and enemies throughout ancient and contemporary history; therefore, no one in Tehran is going to welcome foreign occupiers and bombers. In times of crisis, Iranians rapidly mobilise under the national flag, and the experience of the 12-day war with Israel further substantiates this claim. This is precisely the point that dozens of prominent Western analysts have also highlighted; for instance, as Marc Lynch wrote in Foreign Policy:
“Given the tendency of Iranians to rally around the flag when bombed by the United States and Israel, the most likely effect of a non-decapitation bombing campaign would be to taper off the protests and ultimately end them. No matter how furious Iranians are with the Islamic Republic, a new Iranian leader arriving on the backs of American bombers will find little love among a fiercely nationalist Iranian public.”
Previously, the United States intervened in Middle Eastern countries where such a profound sense of “nationhood” did not exist among their citizens, to the point where many even welcomed the bombings. Here, however,
“Iran” as an identity concept is redefined during crises, and a foreign attack directly pushes this redefinition toward “defending sovereignty” and national cohesion.
“Iran” as an identity concept is redefined during crises, and a foreign attack directly pushes this redefinition toward “defending sovereignty” and national cohesion.
The key takeaway for Washington is to recognise that Iran is a deeply rooted “country”, not merely a “government”.
Institutional resilience
Whether in the case of Saddam’s Iraq or Gaddafi’s Libya, the United States faced countries that were distinctly organised around one or more influential political leaders and a single powerful institution (typically the army); consequently, when that institution and figure suffered severe damage, the very fabric of the country effectively unravelled. Iran, however, by no means possesses a simple institutional setup. A highly interwoven and complex institutional arrangement governs this country, relying more on overlapping structures and missions than on individuals. Indeed, the institutional organisation of the Islamic Republic has evolved in such a way that its primary focus is on survival and administering the country amidst sanctions and security constraints, meaning it will not suffer a domino-effect collapse from intermittent military shocks. This is another point repeatedly articulated by various analysts; for example, Sir Simon Gass wrote for The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI):
“It is uncertain whether even an extended strike campaign could achieve the decapitation needed to reach the goal. In June 2025, when Israeli strikes killed several of Iran’s top military commanders, new appointments were quickly made without much evidence of dislocation. The regime is resilient.”
READ: Iranian ground forces commander says military monitoring enemies ‘around the clock’
Iran is a vast country with exceptionally diverse terrain. Its access to one of the world’s most critical energy export chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Islamic Republic’s long-standing efforts to exert control over this area, is just one of its geographic advantages. Alongside this vastness and access to high-risk maritime environments, Iran’s northern and western flanks are fortified by two rugged mountain ranges; harsh natural barriers that have enabled Iran to extensively develop deep underground facilities and buried missile cities.
Lack of vision (Exit strategy)
The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and ultimately the intervention in Venezuela all began with clear visions and, at least on paper, achieved their short-term objectives; yet, in the long run, they devolved into grueling and terrifying nightmares for the United States.
The logical question is: if wars launched with clear visions turned into such massive foreign policy quagmires for America, what will be the fate of a military intervention in Iran for which absolutely no plan or exit strategy exists?
The logical question is: if wars launched with clear visions turned into such massive foreign policy quagmires for America, what will be the fate of a military intervention in Iran for which absolutely no plan or exit strategy exists?
The US political apparatus itself does not clearly know exactly for what purpose and to create what alternative order it is pushing for an attack. This is another point frequently raised among American experts; for instance, the Atlantic Council notes that:
“Despite tough rhetoric from Washington, the reality is that the US government had no coherent plan for regime change in Tehran— and no meaningful operational capability to engineer political transformation inside a highly repressive, tightly controlled state. Any attempt by the United States to impose regime change by force, whether through the assassination of Khamenei or the dismantling of the regime would almost certainly produce catastrophic outcomes. The most likely scenarios would be a full takeover by the IRGC or a descent into civil war. […] [Military action] carries a high risk of regional escalation… and could draw the United States into yet another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. Such an outcome runs counter both to American public fatigue with endless wars.”
In a hypothetical scenario, imagine the United States launches a massive aerial bombing campaign against Iran aimed at weakening the government, initially intending to carry out widespread assassinations of political and military leaders. But can America guarantee that the power dynamics within Iran during such an intervention would not steer the country toward electing far more radical, militaristic leaders and creating a much more closed society in the post-war era? The answer to this question marks the end of warmongering illusions; an existential pressure on a civilisational state, rather than leading to surrender, results in the radicalisation of structures and the production of an uncompromising war machine whose devastating consequences will haunt US interests in the Middle East for decades. This is a point that stands out to many analysts; for example, Responsible Statecraft highlights:
“Regime decapitation to oust the current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, would be even less likely to yield a regime responsive to U.S. wishes than the ouster of the president, Nicolás Maduro, in Venezuela. A more probable successor regime in Iran would be some kind of military dictatorship dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Regime change in Iran is a classic case of needing to be careful what one wishes for.”
Ultimately, the illusion that a targeted bombing campaign will magically resolve the complex challenge of Iran represents a profound failure of strategic imagination in Washington. Iran is a civilisational state armed with deep-rooted nationalism, an incredibly resilient institutional framework and unforgiving geography. A military strike will not unravel the Islamic Republic; rather, it will forge a highly militarised, uncompromising adversary out of the ashes, uniting the population against a common foreign threat. For the US, launching a war without a viable exit strategy or a clear political endgame is not just a gamble—it is a guaranteed descent into a catastrophic, decades-long regional quagmire.
OPINION: Turkey as Israel’s “next Iran”? A strategic rivalry reconsidered
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
