If you are not paying attention to the dramatic developments between China and the United States, you must understand that something consequential has just taken place.

The US government is backtracking—if not altogether retreating—from the trade war and broader escalation it launched against China. Unlike the hyped language and repeated threats by President Donald Trump to impose massive “reciprocal tariffs,” to “decouple” the US economy from China, and to correct “the greatest theft of wealth in the history of the world,” the retreat is happening in hushed tones and coded diplomatic language.

“I think both countries concluded that having an all-out global trade war between the United States and China would be deeply damaging to both sides and to the world,” US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 25th February.

He called this new phase one of “strategic stability.”

Rubio’s words are misleading. It was not China, nor any other country, that instigated the trade war. It began under the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ doctrine. On 22nd March 2018, Trump signed a presidential memorandum imposing tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese goods under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. By 6th July, 25 percent tariffs were in effect on $34 billion in Chinese imports.

The escalation continued. In September 2018, the United States imposed tariffs on an additional $200 billion worth of Chinese goods—initially at 10 percent, later raised to 25 percent in May 2019. The logic was simple: apply sufficient economic pressure to force Beijing into structural concessions on trade practices, intellectual property, and industrial policy.

China responded in kind.

Though China, due to the massive and remarkable growth of its economy, managed to absorb and counter much of Trump’s economic punishment, the rest of the world struggled to cope with disrupted supply chains and growing uncertainty. Trump remained defiant. Even after leaving office, the tariff architecture remained largely intact.

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Not only did the Biden administration refuse to dismantle the tariff regime, it intensified it. Beginning in October 2022, Washington imposed sweeping export controls targeting advanced semiconductors and chipmaking equipment destined for China. In May 2024, it followed with additional tariff hikes on Chinese electric vehicles, batteries, and solar products.

When Trump returned to office in January 2025, he revived even harsher rhetoric, proposing tariffs of up to 60 percent on all Chinese imports. Despite the lack of clear evidence that such measures were effective, tariffs continued to serve as a central instrument of policy.

Trump’s strategy backfired. A 2019 Federal Reserve analysis found that most tariff costs were borne by US firms and consumers, and a 2026 Federal Reserve Bank of New York study confirmed that roughly 90 percent of the latest tariff burden fell on American businesses and households, effectively functioning as a domestic tax.

Rubio’s “strategic stability” is, of course, code for an admission that the trade war achieved little and that future prospects of decisive success remain dim. This realization is particularly significant ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections. Once again, the economy will prove decisive for US voters. 

But it would be unfair to suggest that this fiasco is Trump’s alone. As in many issues—political polarization, immigration, unstable job markets, and Middle East policy—the attempt to contain or coerce China has become a common denominator across administrations.

As the Obama Administration began recognising the limits—and strategic costs—of its militarized Middle East policies, it introduced the ‘Pivot to Asia’, a shift designed to rebalance US diplomatic, military, and economic focus toward the Indo-Pacific. The broader strategy aimed to contain China’s rise and reassert American influence in the region.

Yet despite years of framing China as the primary strategic challenge, in fact threat, the United States now finds itself expanding its military footprint in the Middle East once again, amid tensions involving Iran and the Israeli war in Gaza. Reports suggest the current buildup is the largest since 2003.

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This leaves little doubt that the original attempt to pressure China into concessions has fallen short. China remains the largest trading partner for most Asian economies, including close US allies. It has also become a leading economic and energy partner for key Middle Eastern states. 

Throughout his campaigns, Trump made defeating China central to his political message. Yet after years of angry language, lofty promises, threats, and tariffs, the moment we have reached is described as “strategic stability.”

Unable to fundamentally alter China’s trajectory, Washington appears once more drawn into Middle Eastern theaters; unlike the 1990–91 and 2003 wars in Iraq, however, without a clear and widely supported strategic vision.

Meanwhile, Beijing has pursued a disciplined, long-term expansion of its geopolitical reach. For example, in January 2026, China led the ‘Will for Peace’ BRICS Plus naval exercises off South Africa, signaling its growing role in security domains traditionally dominated by Western powers. At the same time, it has strengthened its economic networks across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Aside from his unique personal style, Trump’s policies reflect a broader paradox shared by multiple US administrations: an inability to define the true center of gravity of American foreign policy, a disproportionate reliance on economic sanctions and military pressure, and a recurring failure to produce lasting stability.

The main hurdle remains Washington’s refusal to acknowledge that the massive shifts reshaping the global geopolitical map are irreversible. No number of aircraft carriers zigzagging between oceans, and no escalation in tariffs, can undo the structural transformation already underway in Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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