Canada’s defence procurement system is back in the news and on the public policy agenda. And rightly so.

Meeting our NATO defence spending commitments is front and centre for the Carney government. And commentators have noticed this kind of project cannot occur overnight. Moreover, how Canada chooses and funds defence procurements has been neither smooth nor efficient for decades.

I served in two key defence procurement roles in the Harper Government: industry minister and Treasury Board president — essentially the government’s chief operating officer. In those roles, I participated in procurement decisions for Canada’s shipbuilding strategy, and the purchasing of items like F-35 fighter jets and fixed-wing search and rescue planes, among others. Much can still be learned from these procurements.

Why do these decisions take so long and why do costs escalate so greatly? There are many culprits, but two come to mind: industrial and technology benefits (ITBs) and the oversight process.

ITB policy — known as industrial and regional benefits (IRBs) during my time government — requires awardees of defence contracts to undertake business activity in Canada close or equal to the contract’s value. This holds the potential for Canadian jobs, and exports for Canadian firms as part of the defence supply chain. But a major failing with ITBs is that they tend to not result in long-term economic benefits.........

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