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UAE’s Exit from OPEC and OPEC+: Strategic Drivers

45 0
05.05.2026

The UAE’s exit from the intergovernmental groupings of OPEC and OPEC has introduced a new dilemma for the global energy market. In addition to security and geopolitical drivers, simmering structural tensions within OPEC, influenced by competing interests and growing economic and energy ambitions, set the stage for the UAE’s withdrawal from these intergovernmental organisations.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced its decision to withdraw from OPEC and the OPEC groupings in April 2026. This has come on the heels of growing discontent with the posture adopted by its Gulf compatriots following the outbreak of the latest war between the United States (US), Israel and Iran in February 2026. The UAE’s withdrawal is driven by a convergence of needs to pursue energy security and autonomy in the backdrop of regional tensions.

The UAE has been the worst affected by Tehran’s retaliation. By March 2026, approximately 48 per cent of the missiles Iran deployed were targeted at the UAE.[i] This greatly undermined its credibility as a haven for investors and tourists and as a hub for technology and logistics. This appears to have been primarily due to the lack of support from its fellow Gulf nations and, more importantly, their inconsistent approach to dealing with Iran.

The security vulnerabilities presumably proved to be the immediate causal factor in possibly accelerating the UAE’s announcement. In the backdrop of this escalating security crisis for the Emirati state, its remarks, a day before the decision to leave the oil grouping was announced, should have been viewed as a harbinger of emerging fault lines within the Arab fold, which were first sown when the UAE bore the brunt of the Iranian missile strikes.

Regional fragmentation and a lack of solidarity in the face of unrelenting missile strikes, as perceived by the UAE, suddenly brought the underlying regional tensions to the fore. Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Anwar Gargash noted that the GCC countries

supported each other logistically, but politically and militarily, I think their position has been the weakest historically. I expect this weak stance from the Arab League, and I am not surprised by it, but I haven’t expected it from the GCC, and I am surprised by it.[ii]

The UAE, as a member of OPEC, was the fourth-largest oil producer among member states. Therefore, its exit is expected to transform global energy markets and governance on a much greater scale than the exits of other countries (such as Gabon, Ecuador and Qatar) that previously suspended their membership.

Security Drivers and Regional Fallout

The UAE’s decision to step back from its decades-long association with OPEC must also be assessed with the security dynamics and regional competition playing out in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region in mind. As the events following the UAE’s announcement would show, the Emiratis, in light of recent security concerns and the perceived diminished response from their Gulf allies, decided to tie national security considerations to energy-based geoeconomics for the foreseeable future. The growing convergence of these themes arguably proved to be the trigger for the UAE to step away from its association with other oil-exporting countries.

Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have not only supported opposing factions in the Yemeni civil war, but Riyadh has recently begun engaging the Houthis (supported by Iran), perhaps in a bid to re-establish its foothold on its southern border. At the same time, the Emiratis were gradually pushed out of the country by January 2026, with no stake in its future developments despite their decade-long backing of southern separatists to establish influence in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Notably, this Strait is an important maritime chokepoint, given that 30 to 40 per cent of dry goods........

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