As coercive actors capable of sustained campaigns, violent non-state actors across Africa have leveraged their violent activities to extract concessions from states. The broader Sahel region remains the global epicentre of terrorism today, primarily attributed to militant Islamism.

On 22 March 2026, the Malian government released more than 100 alleged jihadist prisoners in exchange for safe passage for fuel convoys.[1] The fuel crisis had brought the country to a standstill last year due to repeated attacks on fuel convoys en route to Mali by the Al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The fuel blockade had resulted in a sudden surge in food prices and the closure of multiple fuel stations in the capital, Bamako. By December 2025, fuel prices had surged above US$ 6 per litre in areas such as Ségou and Mopti, marking an increase of approximately 22 per cent since April 2025.[2] As a landlocked country, the growing pressures imposed by the fuel blockade were intended to stoke further tensions in a society rife with an incomplete transition to military rule, persistent ethnic violence, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and a fragmented counter-terror campaign.

Other parts of the African continent, including Nigeria and areas surrounding the Lake Chad region, have confronted sustained terror campaigns launched by violent extremist groups like Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), or Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP), among others, despite sustained state pressure and military campaigns.

The operational and organisational durability of these non-state actors has shaped the violent extremist landscape. Extremist groups and movements have frequently targeted key state infrastructure, civilians and revenue-generation pathways. This is specifically aimed at eroding trust in state agencies, amplifying existing socio-economic grievances, and undermining state capacity to protect unarmed civilians and supply chains sustaining economic infrastructure. Overall, violent extremism in Africa has proved resilient despite efforts to institutionalise peace, stability and good governance. This transformation has been increasingly evident in Mali.

Coercive Bargaining: Mali

JNIM has systematically targeted key highways, supply routes and fuel convoys, treating them as central to its objectives of pushing a turbulent country into economic paralysis and containing it there. Such pressure tactics have yielded results for JNIM, as evident in the prisoner release reports, as part of its high-intensity, low-cost warfare.

The dynamics of the conflict between the military junta and JNIM have been altered. Counter-terrorism has expanded beyond the focus on organisational degradation, territorial losses and leadership decapitation. Today, it appears to be centred more prominently around crisis management, as the state finds itself boxed into a position where it must engage in backdoor negotiations with the non-state actors it had focused on defeating militarily.

When President Assimi Goita, the head of the military junta, assumed power after a coup in 2021, he had committed the new regime to counter jihadist violence. JNIM’s attacks have repeatedly undermined this pledge. Furthermore, he has been forced to fall back on the negotiation tactics applied by his predecessor, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who ruled Mali from 2013 to 2020.

Moreover, state capacity to neutralise extremist networks is increasingly depleting. This was made evident with the onset of the fuel blockade, as JNIM turned the tide against state forces and their attempts to curb its revenue flows. The military junta had initially sought to restrict the trade of small-scale fuel, for example, through jerry cans in rural regions from July 2025 onwards. This was aimed at cracking down on JNIM’s operational capabilities, which were partly funded by the sale of small-scale fuel in such areas.[3]

The plausible intent of the fuel blockade, as gauged by several analysts, was to instigate people to revolt against the state by sowing discontent. By June 2025, the Malian government had put in place several restrictions, including the banning of organised meetings and political parties, and the imposition of a renewable presidential term for Assimi Goita.

Another key dilemma confronting countries like Mali is the growing evidence of kidnapping-for-ransom, especially of non-Malians, as a tactic adopted as part of terror financing revenues for groups like JNIM. This has created an unlawful and parallel economy within the country. The absence of capacity-building measures to regulate and crack down on such terror-financing avenues, which........

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