In the last few years, China has directed its diplomacy to advance the narrative of being a responsible major power. Through its mediation attempts (Pakistan–Afghanistan, Thailand–Cambodia, Saudi Arabia–Iran), the establishment of alternative institutions (International Organisation for Mediation), and the advancement of normative frameworks such as the Global Governance Initiative, Beijing has sought to showcase its capability to provide public goods, especially as the US appears to withdraw from critical international spaces. These strategic initiatives are aimed not only at countering the China threat discourse but also at demonstrating to the international community the dividends of China’s rise.

Accordingly, in the latest crisis, a major strategic objective for Beijing was to frame itself as a stabilising power, in contrast to Washington’s disruptive interventions. China, in a bid to set itself apart from the US, projected a diplomatic commitment, with Chinese Special Envoy Zhai Jun visiting Middle Eastern countries to prevent escalation and broker negotiations.[3] According to state media narratives, China did not remain on the sidelines of the crisis, but rather has been instrumental in preventing the situation from spiralling out of control. Contrasting China’s policy approach with that of the US, the state media has hailed that at a time when the US and Israel launched military strikes against Iran, Beijing was quick to “inject stabilising force” through “intensive diplomatic mediation”, “clear expression of positions” and “special envoy visits”.[4]

However, the question remains: why did China restrict its posturing to that of a stabilising power rather than a responsible ally? Observers have attributed this behaviour to first, China’s preference for flexible partnerships without binding military or security commitments; second, an active intervention strategy would impact........

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