EU’s Framing of Türkiye

The EU–Türkiye relationship is characterised by deepening functional engagement in trade, migration and security, alongside widening political differences over values, the Cyprus issue, and foreign policy alignment. The most recent debate was triggered by the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during an event hosted by the German daily Die Zeit in Hamburg on 19 April 2026, where she stated that “we must succeed in completing the European continent so that it is not influenced by Russian, Turkish or Chinese. We have to think bigger and geopolitically”.[1] The remarks suggested that the EU increasingly views Türkiye as a strategic external actor rather than as a candidate steadily moving towards integration.

On 21 April 2026, EU Commission spokesperson Paula Pinho clarified that Leyen was highlighting Türkiye’s added responsibility, as an EU candidate country, to use its regional influence in line with EU values.[2] She noted that the remarks specifically referred to Türkiye’s role in the Western Balkans, emphasising expectations that its actions in the region remain consistent with EU principles.

However, the combination of assertive wording and quick clarification reveals both the EU’s geopolitical context and its hesitation to fully own that framing. Speaking at the European Parliament on 20 April 2026, European Commission enlargement chief Marta Kos highlighted that “in light of the changing geopolitical realities in Europe and the Middle East, we need Türkiye”,[3] emphasising the importance of stronger partnerships in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. She noted that Türkiye is the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner, with trade volumes surpassing those with Mercosur and India combined. Kos highlighted Türkiye’s significance as a major economic partner, a critical connectivity corridor between Europe and Asia, and an increasingly important security actor whose role would be central to any future post-war security arrangement in the Black Sea region following a settlement in Ukraine.[4]

Von der Leyen’s formulation should be read as part of a broader EU shift from enlargement as a normative project to enlargement as geopolitical consolidation. By grouping Türkiye with Russia and China, she effectively placed it in the category of external actors capable of shaping Europe’s neighbourhood. This does not suggest that Brussels views Ankara as an adversary; rather, it indicates that Türkiye is increasingly being perceived as a strategically important actor positioned outside the EU’s normative and political core, rather than as a candidate progressing steadily towards membership.

The broader geopolitical environment has reinforced this strategic reassessment. Türkiye has been expanding cooperation with Ukraine in line with European security objectives, increasing its influence in Syria in ways that help alleviate EU concerns over counter-terrorism and migration management, and playing an active role in the South Caucasus through renewed dialogue to resume trade and reopen the border with Armenia.[5] These developments have strengthened Türkiye’s relevance to European strategic calculations even as political integration remains stalled.

Functional Cooperation without Political Integration

The practical relationship between Türkiye and the EU is not collapsing. On 6 February 2026, Marta Kos and Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan........

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