The forthcoming review conference will be critical to maintaining the NPT’s legitimacy as the cornerstone of the global nuclear order. While the NPT retains formal universality, its normative authority and capacity to deliver meaningful disarmament outcomes are, however, increasingly in question.

The 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will take place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2026.[1] Like the 2022 NPT Review Conference, which took place under the shadow of the Russia–Ukraine war, this Review Conference is also taking place amid major geopolitical upheaval in West Asia and global economic stress caused by the US–Israel war against Iran and the subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The review conferences in 2015 and 2022 did not result in a consensus-driven outcome document. The forthcoming review conference will be critical to maintaining the NPT’s legitimacy as the cornerstone of the global nuclear order. The 2026 Conference President, Du Hong Viet, warned that another failure would further weaken the NPT.[2]

The Functioning of the NPT Review Process

The NPT review process is largely driven by a structured mechanism and practice-driven conventions that assess the treaty’s implementation and future direction. In accordance with Article VIII (3) and the 1995 decision on strengthening the review process, State Parties meet every five years at a Review Conference (RevCon), with three annual Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings held in the preceding years. These PrepComs lay the procedural and substantive groundwork, including officer selection, agenda-setting and preliminary discussions. The past ten review conferences have been presided over by a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS) (see Table 1).

Although the NPT Review Conference presidency rotates among five regional groupings[3]—Africa Group, Asia Pacific Group, Eastern European Group, West European and Others Group, and Latin American and Caribbean Group—empirical evidence since 1975 reveals an uneven pattern marked by the absence of Eastern European representation and the consistent selection of non-nuclear weapons states. Such a pattern indicates a managed rather than purely egalitarian distribution of leadership.

The RevCon, which is held over four weeks at UN Headquarters in New York, begins with a general debate followed by detailed negotiations across three Main Committees (MC)—MC I (Disarmament and Security Assurance), MC II (Non-proliferation and regional issues), and MC III (Peaceful use of nuclear energy). Each committee can also establish Subsidiary Bodies for focused discussion on the most pressing issues, such as disarmament steps, the Middle East WMD-free zone, and other institutional concerns. The primary task of a RevCon is to review the implementation of the treaty and past commitments, and to develop a forward-looking action plan. While discussions are underway in the Main Committees, the Chair prepares draft reports based on the discussions, and the Conference President collates information from them to prepare the final document.

Decision-making at the conference is consensus-based, which effectively gives each state veto power. Hence, agreement among the states is difficult, especially on contentious issues; therefore, a comprehensive outcome document has historically reflected a positive geopolitical landscape. Because of the above-mentioned complication, the NPT review process can be considered an institutional and diplomatic forum in which progress depends not only on institutional design but also on political will, negotiation dynamics and geopolitical outlook.

Brief History of NPT Review Conferences

The NPT review process reflects a complex interplay between enduring structural issues and shifting geopolitical realities. The outcome of NPT Review Conferences has been shaped by two broad categories of factors: static/permanent concerns such as security assurances, nuclear technology transfer, and disarmament commitments under Article VI; and dynamic geopolitical contexts, including superpower relations, regional conflicts, and global strategic transformations.

The inaugural review conference of 1975 witnessed active cooperation between the superpowers amid persistent fundamental issues concerning the implementation of Article VI, nuclear safeguards and technology transfer. The conference was conducted in the backdrop of India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974, giving further impetus to establishing firm control over the flow of nuclear material.[4] Despite fundamental differences over structural issues, a consensus was achieved, and the final document was adopted. The second review conference unfolded in a far more turbulent environment with geopolitical disruptions caused by the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These disruptions led the conference towards failure,........

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