Does Coercive Bombing Work?
Air power is a relatively new feature of warfare. Conversely, military coercion, actions to force an adversary to change its behavior short of full-scale war, is as old as history itself. Coercion is a tool of statecraft that offers the benefits of winning a war without incurring the costs. The rise of air power has arguably increased the attractiveness of coercive statecraft, especially for wealthy democratic states that are concerned about casualties. Coercive bombing is viewed as a low cost, low commitment tool for achieving foreign policy objectives. The salient questions are: Does coercive bombing work, and more specifically, what are the conditions that make coercive bombing a viable tool for achieving political objectives? Knowing the answers to these questions should inform strategy choices and more importantly, avoid strategic blunders.
The promise of air power mostly originated from the mind and writings of Italian Brigadier General Giulio Douhet during the Interwar period. His theory has two parts. First, “command of the air” requires air power to aggressively bomb to destroy enemy bases, logistics hubs, and civilian populations deep inside enemy territory where they are most vulnerable. And second, with command of the air achieved, victory in all other domains will be ensured. For Douhet, command of the air meant a degree of control sufficient to prevent enemy aircraft from flying. He was adamant that a determined mass bomber attack would always get through any defenses put in its way.
For Douhet, the ascendancy of the defense in ground warfare rendered decisive combat actions infeasible. However, he did believe that ground and naval actions mattered. But they would be efficiently and effectively executed, almost automatically. In other words, after command of the air is achieved and the enemy’s bases, aircraft, industrial capacity, and the means to mobilize its population to maintain its military forces are destroyed, the war is mostly won. And then, only limited numbers of ground and naval units would be required to mop up the battlefield.
Explicit in Douhet’s concept was that command of the air, essential for winning, required priority of resource allocation. Additionally, air power could not be subordinate to, or in support of, ground or naval forces. This necessitated the creation of an independent air force that controlled all military aircraft. Douhet conceded that air support to ground and naval forces was possible only after command of the air was achieved.
It should be no surprise that air officers in other countries would warmly, quickly, and uncritically embrace Douhet’s ideas. After all, it was in their interests to do so. The U.S. Army Air Forces, the British Royal Air Force, and even the German Luftwaffe fell into line. However, the Soviet Union and Japan were exceptions. Stalin’s purge of leading military officers eliminated their chief air theoretician. His replacement, and the purge environment, did not favor proffering new ideas. For Japan, geography and very conservative leaders made strategic bombing infeasible.
While the principles for successful land warfare evolved over centuries of practical experience by military leaders, Douhet’s principles were futuristic, arguably brilliant, and purely speculative. Uncertainty did not dampen the enthusiasm of Douhet and his international band of evangelist air power followers. But the military adage, “No plan survives first contact with the enemy,” would apply to Douhet’s new conception of war in the crucible of World War II.
World War II—The First Test
The airmen’s penchant for exaggeration can also be attributed to Douhet. Almost every facet of his thesis was proved wrong. This does not mean that air power in World War II was irrelevant because it certainly was not. Still, producing the physical destruction and morale decay for swift victory envisioned by Douhet was elusive. His calculations for the tonnage of bombs, the number of aircraft, and the relative ease of destroying designated targets were pure fantasy. The World War II bomber fleets, the amount of ordnance they carried, and the repetitive missions they flew far exceeded anything Douhet imagined. Still, quick and decisive results from bombing never materialized. Land and naval action not only never lost their primacy but were most effective on the offense, not mired down on the defense as Douhet believed. His assumption of static land fronts was wrong.
Douhet’s insistence that “Nothing a man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere with a plane in flight,” was also off the mark. Many got through but many did not. His minimizing the effectiveness of air defenses proved costly.........
