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The memorandum of understanding that the United States and Iran signed last week has been read in Washington as either a historic victory or a surrender.

After the first high-level talks in Switzerland over the weekend, it is clear that it is neither. The document has become a basis for dialogue and a wider regional follow-on process, which will include political oversight, technical working groups, a communication line for the Strait of Hormuz, and a deconfliction cell for Lebanon.

The memorandum of understanding that the United States and Iran signed last week has been read in Washington as either a historic victory or a surrender.

After the first high-level talks in Switzerland over the weekend, it is clear that it is neither. The document has become a basis for dialogue and a wider regional follow-on process, which will include political oversight, technical working groups, a communication line for the Strait of Hormuz, and a deconfliction cell for Lebanon.

That is genuine progress, but it is only an early step toward a nuclear deal.

Making any further diplomatic headway will require first and foremost reaching a joint understanding on the current status of Iran’s nuclear program. Without that, the memorandum’s central promise—to freeze Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for economic relief while negotiating a final deal—is impossible to verify and easy for either side to contest.

On the nuclear file, the memorandum restates Iran’s pledge not to build a nuclear weapon, commits the parties to agree on a way to dilute and possibly dispose of the country’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, and defers discussion of Iran’s capabilities—including future enrichment and stockpiles—to a final deal.

Until that agreement is reached, Iran is to “maintain the current status quo” of its nuclear program. That is easier said than done because the status quo has not been self-evident ever since the June 2025 U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and the subsequent restriction of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors’ access to affected facilities.

The IAEA’s last verified estimate, from June 13, 2025—now more than a year old—put Iran’s stockpile at 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, which, if enriched........

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