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In the aftermath of the al Qaeda terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 on Sept. 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission Report lamented a “failure of imagination” on the part of the U.S. government and intelligence community. After all, the primary weapons used in the simultaneous attacks were boxcutters, knives, and ultimately, passenger jets.

Terrorists hijacking planes was certainly conceivable. Between 1968 and 1972, there were more than 130 attempted hijackings in the United States, most bound for Havana. Abroad, there were spectacular hijackings across Europe and the Middle East, often conducted by Palestinian terror groups primarily motivated by nationalism. And while these hijackings did not result in terrorists flying planes into buildings, the idea that they could had been discussed at length for decades. In fact, legendary terrorism scholar Brian Michael Jenkins warned about exactly that in 1989 at an international conference on aviation security in Israel: “The nightmare of governments is that suicidal terrorists will hijack a commercial airliner and, by killing or replacing its crew, crash into a city or some vital facility.”

In the aftermath of the al Qaeda terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 on Sept. 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission Report lamented a “failure of imagination” on the part of the U.S. government and intelligence community. After all, the primary weapons used in the simultaneous attacks were boxcutters, knives, and ultimately, passenger jets.

Terrorists hijacking planes was certainly conceivable. Between 1968 and 1972, there were more than 130 attempted hijackings in the United States, most bound for Havana. Abroad, there were spectacular hijackings across Europe and the Middle East, often conducted by Palestinian terror groups primarily motivated by nationalism. And while these hijackings did not result in terrorists flying planes into buildings, the idea that they could had been discussed at length for decades. In fact, legendary terrorism scholar Brian Michael Jenkins warned about exactly that in 1989 at an international conference on aviation security in Israel: “The nightmare of governments is that suicidal terrorists will hijack a commercial airliner and, by killing or replacing its crew, crash into a city or some vital facility.”

U.S. Representative Tim Roemer (left) and Carie Lemack hold copies of The 9/11 Commission Report during a news conference on Dec. 6, 2004. Lemack also holds a photo of her mother, Judy Larocque, who died in the terror attacks.Getty Images/Joe Raedle

Twenty-five years after 9/11, airports can no longer be considered soft targets for terrorists. However, terrorists and violent extremists have access to a range of technologies today that either didn’t exist or were in their infancy two and a half decades ago. The internet has been most consequential for terrorists, allowing them, through websites and social media platforms, to spread their message widely; to make contact with aggrieved individuals; and to radicalize and recruit. But advances in encrypted communications, 3D printing, unmanned aerial systems (drones), virtual currencies, and artificial intelligence (AI) also can serve as force multipliers for lone actors and terrorist organizations planning attacks. Over the last decade, barriers to entry for engaging with these technologies have been appreciably lowered, and access has been commercialized, meaning everyday citizens can now acquire and master tools once obtainable only by states.

In late 2026, a failure of imagination persists, though its form has evolved. While the counterterrorism community today is aware of emerging technologies in the hands of terrorists, it continues to struggle with creatively thinking through how these can be combined or applied to novel use cases. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to assess every possible tool terrorist groups could misuse, it makes sense to consider what adoption and use patterns can tell us about the potential misuse of current technologies. We tend to avoid publishing........

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