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The United States spent decades condemning spheres of influence as archaic relics of a darker age. Now it’s claiming one.

The Trump administration has announced it will “run” Venezuela after capturing President Nicolás Maduro, following up on its pledge to add a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Unencumbered by international responses that are heavy on rhetoric and light on substance, Washington thus joins the very rivals it once lectured in claiming exclusivity in its own neighborhood. An international order based on spheres of influence may soon sit alongside or, according to some, replace the liberal “rules-based” one.

The United States spent decades condemning spheres of influence as archaic relics of a darker age. Now it’s claiming one.

The Trump administration has announced it will “run” Venezuela after capturing President Nicolás Maduro, following up on its pledge to add a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Unencumbered by international responses that are heavy on rhetoric and light on substance, Washington thus joins the very rivals it once lectured in claiming exclusivity in its own neighborhood. An international order based on spheres of influence may soon sit alongside or, according to some, replace the liberal “rules-based” one.

Some commentators have suggested that as unsavory as this whole business might be, embracing spheres of influence is a pragmatic way to reduce the dangers of great-power competition. But this conflates the stability provided by a spheres-of-influence system with the violence that attends competing spheres-of-influence claims.

Spheres of influence can indeed stabilize great-power relations—but only when they are mutually recognized. Without broad great-power buy-in, spheres instead become flash points for competing powers. What’s more, spheres of influence are widely criticized for the high costs they impose on smaller states caught within them. But today, those states have institutional tools to resist and disrupt such arrangements, tools their predecessors lacked. This makes any new spheres system both novel and dangerous: Without mutual recognition from peers and facing disruption from below, Washington’s pivot may exacerbate geopolitical competition more than tame it.

Spheres of influence are as old as the modern states system. Since at least the late 15th century, powerful states have sought them for........

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