Over the past decade, China has been steadily reshaping the global nuclear order. According to U.S. government assessments, Beijing has almost tripled its stockpile of nuclear warheads since 2019. It has rapidly increased its nuclear capabilities on land, in the air, and at sea. It has significantly expanded its infrastructure for the research, development, and assembly of nuclear warheads. And Beijing shows no intention of slowing down. In mid-March, the country announced that it would “strengthen and enlarge” its strategic deterrence capabilities, reaffirming its commitment to qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its nuclear arsenal.

American officials have certainly taken notice. They worry that the bipolar nuclear world—where almost all the globe’s warheads are controlled by either Moscow or Washington—is being replaced by a tripolar one. In response, they are trying to strengthen Washington’s own nuclear stockpile while attempting to negotiate with Beijing. In February, for example, the United States chose not to renew the New START treaty, a nuclear arms reduction agreement between Russia and the United States, because it did not want to be bound by restrictions that excluded China. But despite increasing U.S. pressure, China has consistently refused to conduct nuclear arms control negotiations. It seems to have no interest in constraining its capabilities.

There is a reason why Beijing does not want to haggle over its nuclear forces. The Chinese government believes that, rather than generating risk, a stronger nuclear deterrent will actually stabilize relations with the United States by forcing American officials to treat Beijing as a peer and avoid challenging its core interests. The United States’ recent behavior appears to support that approach. Particularly since U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to office, Washington has been more cautious in handling core Chinese interests, such as Taiwan, and has signaled greater interest in forging a stable bilateral relationship through business deals. Beijing considers this proof of concept and thus sees little reason to change course.

But in reality, China’s repeated rejection of substantive arms control negotiations, meaningful nuclear transparency, and basic confidence-building measures largely undermines stability, even by Beijing’s standards. Such refusals lead to U.S. disillusion with cooperative security solutions and fuel its own expansion of nuclear and missile defense capabilities. China’s growing military cooperation with Russia, including on nuclear issues, has also heightened unease in Europe, where many leaders believe that China is enabling Russian aggression. France and the United Kingdom are rebuilding their nuclear arsenals in response, further diminishing the prospects for multilateral arms control. The result is a more anarchic international landscape that reinforces Beijing’s belief that it needs to continue the buildup.

Escaping this security spiral will not be simple. But there are paths to meaningful limits. China and the United States are both reacting to concerns that the other side will use nuclear weapons first. Neither country actually relies on nuclear first-use strategies, but when it comes to nuclear brinkmanship, perceptions matter just as much as reality, perhaps more. To achieve nuclear stability, both Beijing and Washington must recognize that they are misreading each other. China’s suggestion that the United States adopt or negotiate a no-first-use policy similar to its own would still not yield an agreement credible enough to bridge this perception gap. But if Beijing and Washington can increase transparency at more concrete levels—on short-range nuclear capabilities, for instance, which are the most relevant to a regional conflict and most likely to drive first-use fears—then they can defuse the most acute risks in an intensifying nuclear competition.

In a sense, China’s nuclear weapons program is a reaction to its threat perceptions. Chief among them is a fear that Washington is more powerful, and will........

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