Just days after clerics in Iran celebrated the 47th anniversary of the revolution that brought them to power, the United States and Israel assassinated Iran’s senior leadership, razed its military infrastructure, and humbled the once seemingly impregnable theocracy. The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior military and political leaders at the hands of their foremost adversary leaves a gaping vacuum. U.S. President Donald Trump seems to think that airstrikes will enable an uprising; he has urged Iranians to “take over” their government.

The bitter reality, however, is that the remnants of the regime are well armed and well entrenched. For years, they have been preparing for a scenario just like the one today. After decades of brutal repression, Iranians are poorly equipped to mount a successful challenge to clerical rule. When the guns fall silent, the most likely outcome is that some residual version of Iran’s revolutionary regime will remain intact, albeit more bloodied, battered, and vulnerable than at almost any point since 1979.

There is still hope for profound political change in Iran’s long-term future. But the air campaign that U.S. and Israeli forces are currently conducting is unlikely to bring it about. Whenever the war ends, Iran will enter a fraught and risky transitional period, during which Washington will likely find itself involved in some form of diplomacy with powerful factions inside Iran. The United States cannot allow the representatives of a defeated, discredited system to hijack that eventual postwar dialogue. That is why it is crucial for the United States to begin charting a course for the day after the fighting ends by seeking reasonable interlocutors. So far, however, there is no evidence of any serious planning by the Trump administration for what comes next. Washington cannot count on the regime to crumble or for Iranians to succeed in overthrowing their leaders. The United States must focus on how it can use a combination of military force and diplomacy to make sure that whoever leads Iran embraces a more humane and inclusive system of government.

Even before the latest strikes, Iran’s Islamic Republic had been weakened. Its networks of proxies across the Arab world were decimated by two years of on-and-off fighting with Israel, and U.S. and Israeli strikes in June entombed Iran’s nuclear program, once its crown jewel. As 2026 began, Iran’s currency was in free fall, its water and energy was in short supply, and its people were willing to confront their government to a degree unseen since the shah was toppled in 1979. The ferocity with which the regime crushed protests in January underscores its sense of siege and desperation to cling to power. According to the Human Rights Activists News Agency, at least 7,000 demonstrators were killed.

Now, Tehran’s aging revolutionary leadership must contend with a joint U.S.-Israeli military operation apparently aimed at its overthrow. The bombardments have already leveled Iran’s offensive and defensive military capabilities; eliminated an entire echelon of political, military, and intelligence officials; and left its ruling system in ruins. And Tehran’s attempts at retaliation have exacerbated its isolation. (It has lashed out by striking Israel and hotels, airports, and U.S. bases in Arab Gulf countries.)

In spite of such destruction, however, the regime in Tehran is likely to survive in the short term. The Islamic Republic was built for endurance and redundancy and has been preparing for this day for years. What’s left of the elite are battening down the hatches. The country’s byzantine system of clerical and representative institutions has been designed to facilitate top-down control and to thwart any meaningful competition. After strikes last June, Khamenei prepared for decapitation by instructing officials in leadership roles to identify four possible replacements. And it appears as if lower-level commanders have been delegated power to strike so Iran could retaliate, even with degraded command-and-control systems.

The regime’s mandarins have experience in consolidating power. They have, after all, been on the ropes before: in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, when the newfound theocracy faced insurrections, ethnic violence, and an invasion by Iraq, and during its last big leadership transition, in 1989, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died. Having endured before, the regime believes it can outlast Trump’s attention span. And as bruised as the regime is, it is still in a better position than its potential challengers.

Any Iranians hoping to unseat their government face daunting odds. The regime has spent decades undermining or killing those willing to stand against it. The opposition is divided, unarmed, and unable to easily communicate. Iran’s ballistic missiles and nuclear program may be decimated, but it still has the guns to kill protesters or coup plotters. On the day the war ends, it is likely to be the remnants of the Islamic Republic that retain the upper hand.

Even though the regime in Tehran will probably survive this round of fighting, it can’t last forever. Eventually, in the aftermath of a devastating military defeat, the regime’s survivors will have to pick new leaders. The country hasn’t replaced a supreme leader in 36 years. (Khamenei and his inner circle, most of whom are dead, were meant to pick the next one in backroom deliberations.) Even before the war, Khamenei’s eventual succession promised to be tricky. The top contender, Ebrahim Raisi, died unexpectedly in a helicopter accident in May 2024, and much of the generation that made the revolution has already died or is too old to be effective.

When the dust settles, there is bound to be regime infighting. Long-standing apparatchiks, including Ali Larijani, Iran’s top national security official, and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament, will cooperate warily to try to preserve the postrevolutionary project, but they will come up against internal discord, poor relations with neighboring countries, and the gargantuan task of rebuilding the country. The theocracy’s grip on power will probably never be fully reestablished. Its signature projects—namely, its nuclear and ballistic missile programs—have backfired spectacularly.

Iran hasn’t replaced a supreme leader in 36 years.

Although the United States probably can’t unseat the regime with airstrikes, it has a rare chance to influence Iran’s next political order through diplomacy. Trump may be inclined to deal directly with whoever is left standing after the war, but he must avoid any deal that cements the power of the current elite. There are already reports that some historically pragmatic regime officials, such as Larijani, have tried to restart nuclear negotiations through Omani mediators. A bad agreement could be a lifeline for the vestiges of the revolutionary state. Now that U.S. and Israeli strikes have taken out some of Tehran’s most menacing leaders, Washington and its partners should set a high bar for deciding with whom they will negotiate.

Any diplomatic engagement with the regime’s successors must be guided by a clear vision for advancing meaningful, lasting change within Iran. War has degraded the traditional threats posed by Iran—its nuclear ambitions, its ballistic missiles, and its proxies. Now, the United States has the opportunity to focus on what it has long neglected in its dealings with Tehran: the chance to help Iranians secure the future they deserve.

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