These, it might seem, are good days for the Islamic Republic of Iran. After years of being diplomatically isolated, economically strangled, and militarily assaulted, the Iranian regime came face-to-face with its nightmare scenario—a full-blown war with Israel and Washington—and survived. The United States began bombing Iran on February 28 with the goal of destroying the country’s nuclear program, its missile program, and even its government, only to fail spectacularly at each objective. In fact, Tehran may now be stronger than it was when the war began. It successfully seized the Strait of Hormuz and shuttered it, sending energy prices skyward. Its armed forces have proved capable of continuing to damage American military bases despite coming under heavy bombardment. U.S. support for the war, always weak, has fallen, and international anger at Washington has spiked. Little wonder, then, that many analysts think Tehran will stay the course over the coming year.

Iranian officials are no doubt proud of how their country has fared against Israel and the United States. They have publicly bragged about their success and even declared victory. But in private conversations, the regime’s elites remain quite nervous. They know that the United States has many tools and tactics it can use to increase the pressure on Iran, and they are concerned that the factors that seem to be holding Washington back—dwindling stockpiles of ammunition, domestic public opinion, and international opposition—could go away, grow manageable, or otherwise become unimportant to American officials.

For the United States, this might seem like good news. If Tehran still fears Washington, perhaps the U.S. government can pressure Iran’s leaders into making concessions. But this misreads the mood in Iran’s capital. The country’s elites have been hardened by the war, which killed their friends and family members. They see February 28, 2026, the same way Israelis see the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas—as the moment their enemy proved willing to slaughter them, and thus as proof it must be permanently defeated. They never had much faith in American negotiators; now, they have virtually none.

Iran, then, is adopting a strategy toward the United States defined by escalation and continuous offense. That means it will neither stay the course nor compromise with Washington. Instead, it will start doing even more to hurt the economies of the United States’ regional partners and to decimate global energy markets, as well as expand its attacks on U.S. military infrastructure. It could try to assassinate American and Israeli officials. It may even launch ground offensives against its neighbors, including by trying to seize U.S. bases located in Gulf Arab countries.

This approach might fail to make the United States relent. But even if neither side can overpower the other right now and both accept a settlement, peace is unlikely to last. Tehran believes that Washington will regroup and, eventually, start fighting again. The regime is committed to responding forcefully to any American provocation, and perhaps even attacking without one. It does not think it can live with a U.S. presence in the Middle East, so it is willing to go full tilt to get the United States out. Iran’s enduring goal, in other words, will be to make staying in the region so painful that Washington has no choice but to withdraw most of its troops, accept Tehran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, and acknowledge the Islamic Republic as an enduring power.

When the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran began, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, was at a meeting in Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s compound. Araghchi had spent the last several months negotiating with the United States over Iran’s nuclear program, but in the preceding weeks, Washington had moved many of its military assets closer to the Persian Gulf and demanded that Iran give up all nuclear enrichment. U.S. President Donald Trump was publicly suggesting that he might try to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Araghchi was in the middle of briefing senior officials on these developments and the growing likelihood of conflict when the bombs started to fall.

Khamenei’s compound was targeted in the initial strikes, which killed many senior officials—including the supreme leader himself. But Araghchi lived. He emerged from the rubble stunned and covered in debris. According to an account he gave to an Iranian podcaster, he ran into the street, stopped a passing car, and asked the driver to take him to the foreign ministry. From there, he tried to reach any military commanders he could and began contacting foreign leaders. Soon, he was joined by other surviving officials.

The Islamic Republic had long anticipated that Khamenei and his deputies might be killed, so it was well prepared to handle the aftermath of the attacks. The government had spent the better part of a year, for instance, decentralizing its political and military bureaucracy so that provincial governors and military commanders could operate without instructions from top leaders. Senior officials had to designate at least two people to succeed them should they not survive. But the experience was nonetheless traumatic for the regime. Iran’s leaders could no longer remain in one place and instead had to spend hours in cars and on motorcycles shuttling between bunkers. They had to contend with the loss of colleagues, friends, and sometimes family. The country’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, lost his wife, a sister, and a niece in the attacks—in addition to his father. U.S. intelligence officials say that he himself was injured.

Iran sees February 28 the same way Israel sees October 7.

By themselves, these shocks would have been enough to........

© Foreign Affairs