Analysts generally organize the options for a Chinese military move against Taiwan into three categories: an invasion to seize direct control of the island; a “joint firepower strike” that would bomb Taiwan’s cities and political institutions, terrorizing Taiwanese civilians into surrender; and a maritime blockade to starve Taiwan into submission. All these missions are complex, high-cost gambles for China that would consume large quantities of military assets and result in immense casualties and property damage. A blockade would add the risk of directly attacking third parties—specifically, cargo ships from other countries—making it more likely that China would also have to fight international powers, including the United States. Nevertheless, many analysts think that a blockade is the most tempting scenario of the three for Beijing, because it would avoid sending Chinese forces up against Taiwan’s prepared defenses and would capitalize on what Chinese leaders consider Taiwan’s vulnerabilities, including the island’s extreme dependence on international trade. Still, a traditional blockade risks escalation and imposes extensive military costs on China.

But China has an underexamined option, one that could generate the effects of a traditional blockade with a lower cost for Beijing. A “blockade by fire”—a missile strike campaign directed specifically against Taiwan’s port infrastructure—would minimize the risks that China would face. This kind of strike would not focus major combat operations in the heart of Taiwan’s cities, as in the case of an invasion or a joint firepower strike. Nor would it put third-party ships at risk, as with a traditional blockade. And because a blockade by fire would use only a small number of missiles aimed at a narrow set of targets in Taiwanese ports, it would avoid the need to enforce a cordon around the island and would not expose China’s navy to defensive missile fire from Taiwan. Under a blockade by fire, international commercial ships would still be free to sail around the island, meaning that other East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea could continue the bulk of their trade essentially undisturbed. Ships could even sail to Taiwan, but they would be unable to load and unload cargo in the heavily damaged ports. Simulation models of attacks like this suggest that China could substantially interrupt Taiwan’s trade and keep it suppressed for an extended period, using only a few hundred ballistic missiles.

Global trade would have to adjust to any type of blockade against Taiwan. In fact, the indirect economic pain to other countries from a blockade by fire would be the same as that of a traditional blockade scenario. The key difference is that a blockade by fire would not involve direct Chinese attacks on non-Taiwanese ships. The destruction would be limited to Taiwanese assets, helping Beijing maintain its argument that the operation was strictly an internal matter and ensuring that international powers couldn’t claim a greater need to intervene.

Overall, a blockade by fire would make efficient use of China’s military assets. Given the limited number of targets, the Chinese military would be able to reserve the bulk of its capabilities, including the........

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