The overwhelming victory of President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party in last weekend’s parliamentary elections was not only expected but planned. Compulsory voting in organizations dependent on the budget and in many corporations; standardized voting in the military, law enforcement agencies, and the so-called new territories; mechanical voting in the spirit of “take my vote and leave me alone”; the spread of electronic voting; and the pre-election removal of Yabloko, the only antiwar party still operating legally—all these and other factors assured a supermajority for the ruling party. Even votes cast for other parliamentary parties amounted to support for the government, because they, too, are controlled by the Kremlin.

Nonetheless, for Putin, this refreshed mandate offers renewed legitimacy for his “special military operation” in Ukraine, showing domestically what the Kremlin is projecting internationally: that Russia is in a position of strength and is ready to pursue its military objectives with even more abandon. The Kremlin’s main goal is to create the illusion of a total commanding majority, regardless of the actual situation. Everyone supports Putin, the results convey, and therefore they must also support the country’s military policies, relentless suppression of dissent, and anti-Western course; those who oppose him are outcasts and pariahs. Indeed, since 2022, elections in Russia have redefined citizenship as support for the war.

Reality is more complicated. Since April, public polling in Russia has consistently signaled that things are not going very well for the government. According to the independent Levada Center, which has been regularly asking the question, in July, the percentage of respondents who considered the special operation a success had fallen to 50 percent, a drop of nearly 20 percentage points from the previous year. In the same poll, the number of people who believed the country was moving in the right direction had fallen by ten percentage points from a year earlier, to 54 percent. Moreover, between July 2025 and July 2026, the president’s own approval rating declined 12 percent—a very significant drop in a personalist autocracy.

Alongside this, general public morale has steadily declined. There is now constant anxiety over the protracted war and the possibility of further military mobilization, as well as about inflation, far-reaching Internet restrictions, and an unending fuel crisis. According to Levada Center surveys done in August, two-thirds of respondents said they faced problems with mobile Internet access, messaging apps, and gasoline shortages. Gasoline shortages seriously disrupted the lives of one in three respondents, while Internet restrictions affected one in five. Massive military spending and rising fuel prices have been major drivers of inflation, and starting in October, a spike in utility rates will add to those pressures.

Now that elections have taken place, many Russians fear another military mobilization, although the Kremlin—wary of undermining the illusion of a somewhat normal life amid a war that has reached the heart of Russia in the form of drone attacks—seems to prefer selective and covert mobilization over a general call-up. But other new pressures cannot be ruled out. As long as Putin believes that time is on his side, and the people—apparently hypnotized by what the Kremlin calls the “unity” demonstrated during the elections—are ready to bear the burden of troubles, he will continue the war. And continuing means escalating, abroad and at home.

Already, the Russian president has rejected a new U.S. diplomatic push and stepped up the pace and nature of attacks in Ukraine. Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin foreign policy experts speak of the various ways, both nonnuclear and nuclear, that Russia can escalate........

© Foreign Affairs