A Chinese military takeover of Taiwan is often portrayed as inevitable and imminent. For many observers, including those writing in Foreign Affairs, U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambivalent public statements about the United States’ commitments to Taiwan’s defense and apparent indifference to the island’s fate might tempt Beijing to achieve unification with Taiwan through military force soon—possibly before the end of 2026. Washington’s war with Iran and the redeployment of U.S. defenses from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East have further raised concern that China could seize the island without having to fear a U.S. response.

But these speculations misunderstand Beijing’s strategy. China wants to unify with Taiwan at the lowest possible cost, and it currently believes that unification will become easier and less costly as time passes. As China develops the military and economic capabilities to deter U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan, it believes that it can compel the island into capitulation without necessarily needing a full-scale invasion. And in the meantime, Beijing is confident that it can prevent Taiwan from trying to become formally independent.

Of course, China has not ruled out the use of force. There are circumstances in which it would still invade or blockade the island, including if Taiwan were to declare independence, if Washington were to give Taiwan official diplomatic recognition, or if Beijing were to become convinced that there is no pathway to unification that does not require force. But there is little risk of military action in the near term because Beijing increasingly believes that its long-term strategy to bring Taiwan into the fold is working. Polls, for instance, show decreasing support for independence among Taiwan’s youth. And in April, Cheng Li-wun, the chair of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing and reaffirmed her party’s opposition to independence and support for the so-called 1992 Consensus, the political formulation centered on the idea that the two sides of the strait belong to “one China.”

Beijing’s belief that time is on its side will face a major test in 2028, when presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States could shake Beijing’s confidence in its strategy. If Taiwan reelects its current president and China judges that he is creating momentum and justification for formalizing the island’s independence, Beijing could reassess its approach—though it would still be unlikely to conclude that a military takeover is necessary—and decide to apply sharper forms of pressure, such as sending ships and aircraft into Taiwan’s territorial waters and airspace or imposing a quarantine around the island. For now, however, Chinese leaders see patience as a winning strategy.

Beijing’s strategy is rooted in the conviction that the balance of power is tilting in its favor against Washington. Over the past year in particular, China has become more assured of its rise and of the United States’ decline. Beijing believes that its model of governance delivers better outcomes than Western democracy, which it sees as increasingly dysfunctional. It also feels that it has the capacity to withstand U.S. economic and technological pressure and has amassed effective tools to shape Washington’s decision-making on trade, technology, and Taiwan.

China’s growing confidence stems partly from how it handled the Trump administration’s trade war in 2025. Beijing retaliated against Trump’s escalating tariffs by imposing its own reciprocal duties and implementing restrictions on exports of rare-earth elements—moves that it concluded quickly led Washington to capitulate on its threats. China has also become more optimistic about its ability to develop technologies that it sees as crucial to strengthening its national power despite U.S.-led sanctions and export controls. In artificial intelligence, for example, the emergence of DeepSeek, a Chinese large language model that rivals the performance of U.S. models but was made at a fraction of the cost, buoyed state and investor confidence that China could eventually close the gap with the United States.

Still, Beijing remains clear-eyed about the economic and political challenges it faces. The most recent five-year plan, which sets medium-term development priorities and targets through 2030, highlights the “risks and hidden dangers” in the Chinese economy, including mounting local government debt, persistent deflation, an ongoing property market crisis, and slowing productivity growth. It also identifies “threats of hegemonism,” an indirect reference to the many levers that Beijing worries Washington can pull to block China’s rise.

Chinese leaders see patience as a winning strategy.

Beijing’s assessment that its development path is both widening and perilous shapes how it approaches Taiwan. China is convinced that its eventual strength will dissuade the United States and Taiwan from putting up much of a fight, and its expanding national power will attract the people of Taiwan to the benefits of unification. Even if Beijing decides that using force to achieve........

© Foreign Affairs