At the end of June, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview in which he declared, once again, that Russia would win its war against Ukraine. The Russian army, he said, was advancing along the roughly 800-mile frontline and occupying more Ukrainian land every day. Kyiv, by contrast, was flailing. He acknowledged that the Ukrainian drone strikes torching Russian oil refineries and other critical infrastructure deep behind the frontlines were “creating problems.” But Russians would adapt and persevere. “These terrorist attacks have no impact whatsoever on the situation,” he said.

If this were 20 months ago, Putin’s confidence would have been warranted. At the time, recently elected U.S. President Donald Trump was praising Moscow and criticizing Kyiv. Russian troops were making slow but steady gains on the battlefield. Putin could thus follow three strategies, as we argued in a March 2025 Foreign Affairs piece. Under Plan A, the Kremlin would work with the White House to make Kyiv accept a deal written in Moscow. Under Plan B, Putin would simply hold out until Trump pulled U.S. support for Ukraine, allowing Russian troops to roll to victory. Failing that, Putin could pivot to Plan C: continuing to fight and ultimately prevailing on the battlefield.

Today, however, Russia’s position has deteriorated. Plan A—winning over Trump—failed; Putin didn’t even mention the U.S. president in his recent interview. Plan B also went awry. Although the White House stopped providing Ukraine with many types of assistance, the United States has continued to supply vital intelligence to Kyiv and enforce sanctions against Russia. Meanwhile, Kyiv has been able to turn to its European backers to make up for the lost aid. In fact, Ukraine is now better positioned militarily than it was last year. Russia, by contrast, is losing more soldiers than it can recruit and stalling out on the battlefield. Its economy is facing increasing trouble. Thus, Plan C, in which Russia would win by outlasting Ukraine, also is not working.

But that does not mean Putin will change course. Russia’s problems are real, but the country is nonetheless capable of sustaining the conflict. Its economy remains functional enough, and it has the manpower and weaponry needed to keep battling. Moscow is also devising new ways to regain the initiative. The Kremlin’s insistence on continuing to fight will make life worse for Russians, and so there are elites in Moscow calling for a negotiated resolution. But there is no indication that Putin is listening. The war, then, is almost certain to drag on.

When Trump took office in 2025, the Kremlin believed it could achieve a diplomatic coup. During the 2024 campaign, Trump had pledged to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours.” Upon taking office, he moved to pressure Ukraine’s leaders to accede to some of Russia’s demands. In February 2025, he insisted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agree to an immediate cease-fire with Russia and insinuated that Kyiv was responsible for the war. When Zelensky refused, Trump temporarily suspended intelligence sharing and military aid to Ukraine. Vice President JD Vance delivered a speech at the 2025 Munich Security Conference in which he declared that the United States was pulling back from Europe. And in August 2025, Trump and Putin held an amiable summit in Alaska. Afterward, the U.S. president said, again, that Zelensky was the reason the conflict wasn’t finished.

The trajectory of the Russian economy and the dynamics of the battlefield further boosted Putin’s confidence. In 2024, Russia’s GDP grew by 4.3 percent, fueled by military production and domestic consumption. Inflation was high but manageable. The Russian armed forces were recruiting more men than they were losing, whereas the Ukrainian army was losing more soldiers than it was gaining. The creeping occupation of the Donbas was costing Russia tens of thousands of troops, but these losses were tolerated as the country continued to advance. In 2024, Putin captured around 1,600 square miles of Ukrainian territory. Russia was producing nearly as many drones as Ukraine and using them in increasingly creative ways. It was producing far more traditional weapons, such as artillery shells and missiles, than was Ukraine or its Western partners. From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, a Russian victory was inevitable.

But not for the first time, Putin’s complacency led to overconfidence. He continued to push for conditions that Trump either could not accept or could not deliver—including that Kyiv surrender parts of the Donbas it still controlled and sign away much of its sovereignty.........

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