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The Future Of The Shah In The Era of Balen Shah: Exploring Debates On The Return Of Monarchy In Modern Nepal – OpEd

9 0
20.03.2026

The Shah dynasty, which ruled Nepal for 240 years, began when Prithviraj emerged as a first king of small Gorkha principality. The name of the Gorkha principality originated from Gorakhnath (A Saint) as he was believed to have lived and meditated there. As per one Nepalese tale, once Gorakhnath met to Prithvi Narayan Shah (First King of Gorkha and the Founder of Modern Nepal) and tested humility by offering him curd. When Prithvi Narayan Shah hesitated to take the curd, the Gorakhnath gave him a mixed blessing. The first one – success in unifying Nepal and establishment of a powerful Nepal kingdom. However, on the other hand, he cursed him that his dynasty’s rule would eventually come to end after 10 generations.

The history of the Nepalese monarchy can be divided into three phases: the first, the age of absolute monarchy, began with Prithvi Narayan Shah (1743–1775) and ended with Rajendra Bikram Shah (1816–1847). The second phase was the Rana era, and during this period, the Ranas as Prime Ministers had ruled Nepal as hereditary autocrats, and reduced the Shah Kings to symbolic figures (Surendra Bikram Shah (1847–1881), Prithvi Bir Bikram Shah (1881–1911) and Tribhuvan (1911–1950). 

The third phase is a constitutional monarchy. It started when King Tribhuvan was forced into exile to India. He later allied with the Nepali Congress to overthrow the Rana regime and establish a constitutional monarchy in 1951. For a short period, Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah became  the king of Nepal; however, after King Tribhuvan returned from exile, he stepped out and began his second reign.  Following this, Shah Dynasty Kings like Mahendra (1955–1972), Birendra (1972–2001), and Dipendra (2001) ruled Nepal. The Shah Dynasty’s rule ended with Gyanendra’s reign (2001–2008). 

During the constitutional monarchy period, a struggle between the parliamentary forces and the monarchy has been witnessed. The monarchy repeatedly attempted to override parliamentary authority and concentrate power in its own hands. The most prominent example was the 1960 coup d’état when the king dismissed the Prime Minister, dissolved the parliament, suspended the Constitution and established a panchayat system of party-less democracy in which political parties were banned from contesting elections. The state highly suppressed their social activities. This led to the concentration of power in the hands of the monarchy. Later on, the protests led by students and political parties in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, against the Panchayat System, forced the king to step down and to establish a multiparty constitutional monarchy in 1990.

Even after the 1990 setback, King Birender tried many times to consolidate power in his own hands. King Birender tried many times to overpower the parliamentary parties with the help of the Maoists. Before he was able to execute his plans, he was killed by Dipendra in the royal massacre of 2001 that led to the coronation of Gyanendra, who came to power for the second time. After becoming king, he intervened in 2002 by dismissing the sitting Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba. Later, he staged a coup in 2005 under the pretext of fighting the Maoists, and was suspended, but he was forced to step down after the 2nd Jana Andolan mass uprising in 2006, which was supported by both the parliamentary parties and the Maoists. By 2008, the Constituent Assembly dissolved the monarchy in Nepal, and Nepal became a Federal Democratic Republic. 

Notwithstanding, the monarchy’s end in 2008, a segment of Nepali society continues to support and demand its return to the Nepalese constitutional framework. Due to that, pro-monarchy protests in Nepali politics have emerged in recent years, starting in November 2023, when protests erupted in Kathmandu, followed by another wave on 21 Feb and 9 April 2024, organised by leaders such as Durga Prasai, an ex-Maoist fighter who later became a promoter of the monarchy in Nepal, and pro-monarchy parties such as Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP). 

There was another wave of protests in support of the monarchy in 2025, mostly centred in Kathmandu and its nearby areas. A recurring pattern has emerged when the king returns to Kathmandu from any tour there; he used to be welcomed by thousands of his supporters, who later shout pro-monarchy slogans such as Raja aau, desh bachau! (“Come back, king, save the country”). This happened when the king returned from western Nepal on 7 March 2025, when thousands of supporters gathered to welcome him at the International Airport. 

Similarly, in March 2026, just before the general elections, when the king returned from Jhapa, again he was welcomed with a red carpet by his supporters and organised a mass rally in his support. Even King Gyanendra is trying to soft-launch himself; for example, on 19 February, before the democratic day in Nepal, the king gave a speech in which he criticised the contemporary political system and demanded reform and people’s support for him. This rise in pro-monarchist sentiment among Nepalese people can be due to instability in the current political system. 

Over the past 20 years, Nepal has had 14 governments, and none has completed its term. Some people see it as an institution that can bring stability. The second reason is that the old traditional Nepal monarchy’s support base is small but sufficient to draw crowds to the streets. The third reason is the rise of Hindu nationalism in Nepalese society, because the king is also seen as a face and protector of Hinduism. In addition, the fourth reason is the people, who are dissatisfied with the democratic system and see monarchy as an alternative to the present multiparty system.

While pro-monarchy protests gained visibility in Nepal’s political discourse, a parallel political development has been unfolding. In September 2025, a mass protest, also known as the Nepalese Gen Z protests or Jana Andolan III, broke out in Nepal, expressing public resentment against the established political elite. 

In the General Elections 2026, people did not support the monarchy or pro-monarchy parties and led to the rise of new political parties and leaders such as Balen Shah, Harka Sampang and their party, Rastriya Swatantra Party, and Shram Sanskriti Party. The landslide victory of  Balen Shah and his party emerged as  an alternative over the  traditional parties/pro-monarchy parties . It reflected a growing public trust towards democratic institutions other than traditional ones such as monarchy/pro-monarchy political parties.  

Despite monarchy strength on the roads, the same has limited public support for its return. Moreover, the institution of monarchy is in decline in the subcontinent and around the world. There is no example of a transitioned democratic country, reverted to monarchy. Furthermore, all the mainstream political parties, other than RPP, support a republican form of government for Nepal because, traditionally, during a constitutional monarchy, the king sought to consolidate their power and posed a challenge to the parliamentary system. This recent election shows that Nepal’s people did not support monarchy and pro monarchy parties. Concomitantly, no political parties have been supporting the monarchy, which has been  characterized in terms of  threats of royal coups and undue interference in democratic governance.

With the passage of time, a full restoration of monarchy appears unlikely. The persistence of monarchist sentiments reflect deeper dissatisfaction within a section of Nepal’s society with the Nepalese  democratic system. However, the pro- democratic parties need to address the Nepalese people and Gen Z dissatisfaction. This is the only way to keep Gorakhnath’s prophecy fulfilled.

Yugdeep Airi (Ph.D Scholar), Department of South and Central Asian Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda (India) 151401.

Prof. Bawa Singh, Department of South and Central Asian Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda (India) 151401.


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