The Japanese government has announced plans to beef up its defences in western island prefectures by setting up radar, ammunition depots and equipping them with Type-12 anti-ship missiles in a move to strengthen the ability to defend Japanese territory and marine areas, to prevent any coercion, and to ensure the safety of international sea lanes. While the increased military capability is intended to be capable of effectively deterring any attempted coercion of Japan, the decision may also be seen as an escalation. Therefore, it is important to balance between deterrence and escalation.

This incident is closely related to the concept of the security dilemma. The Japanese government explained the deployment of early warning sensors and the arrival of a logistics unit by referring to the defence of Japan. China is likely to view the placement of surveillance sensors in Okinawa and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a Japanese attempt to enhance its ability to monitor Chinese developments. China will probably increase its own surveillance activities in the area in order to counter the Japanese advantage. As a result, Chinese warships and submarines may be patrolling the area more intensively, thereby increasing the risk of accidental collisions.

Japan’s domestic politics will remain a major influence on Japan’s security policy. Japan’s people have a long history of peace-loving sentiments and an innate predisposition to avoid anything that is perceived as being military or militaristic. This historical legacy, in conjunction with contemporary cultural sensitivities, means that any revival of the military in a manner reminiscent of the Imperial Japanese Army before 1945 is likely to be met with considerable hostility. Moreover, Japan’s high levels of debt and its rapidly ageing population will also serve to act as a powerful brake on any significant increases in defence expenditure in the short to medium term. Any attempt to maintain defence capabilities in the face of an austerity budget will therefore have to be carried out as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible, with any new systems that are developed providing an unambiguous defensive advantage. The maximum use of the defence budget will also be necessary to achieve the desired level of defence preparedness.

The US has long argued that Japan should play a larger role in the Indo-Pacific region as a “stabilising” force. In ASEAN, however, concerns are growing about increasing competition between Japan and China and the resulting risks for regional trade. In South Korea, there is an acknowledgement of the need to deter North Korea, but there are also many concerns about possible consequences for economic relations with China.

For Japan, there are two strategic challenges to deal with: first, to be able to credibly deter threats; secondly, not to be at risk of escalation. Thus, any action carried out in the name of deterrence needs to be carefully, prudently and transparently taken. For example, any military deployment has to be legal, proportionate to the threat it is aimed at counteracting and part of an effective chain of command designed to prevent any mistake or miscalculation from leading to an unintended escalation. Providing enough advance notice of major military exercises would also be highly recommended in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings.

The maritime affairs have recently been making headlines in Japan. For Japan to enhance its national security, it must modernise its military capability to safeguard its sea lanes and interests. At the same time, Japan must strengthen its diplomatic efforts and cooperation in the region. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as the Notification of Intentions and the establishment of military hotlines could help to avert any minor incidents from becoming major controversies. Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief exercises would be another way to demonstrate the civilian use of military capabilities.

Alliances and economics will also come into play. Japan will have to do more to carry its weight in the alliance, and it may find itself cooperating more with other states in the region in a manner reminiscent of its current arrangements with the United States—collaborative procurement, joint training and the like. But Japan’s economy is deeply tied to China’s, and Tokyo will want to make sure that any new defence actions it takes are seen by Beijing as being intended to protect Japan’s economic interests in the region and to prevent instability in the flow of trade.

Japan’s campaign to strengthen its military will be judged as a success if it can both deter and negotiate. While deterring is important, openness and constructive dialogue on confidence-building measures will be key to ensuring the success of Japan’s new security policy. If Japan’s military buildup is balanced by more frank and open communication and by concrete steps on confidence-building measures, this should contribute to greater stability in the region. To maximise the chances of success, deterrence should be combined with dialogue.

China will most likely respond to the rise in US naval presence in the region by increasing its naval and air patrols and reconnaissance missions in Taiwan’s surrounding waters. Japan should take into account the increased possibility of a miscalculation or clash between China and Taiwan when it boosts its defence capabilities. This means that Japan not only needs to strengthen its defence capabilities, but also needs to lower the risks of possible clashes, such as those with China and China-related military vessels, while at the same time keeping lines of communication open with neighbouring countries and their militaries.

The relationship between politics and economic development is very complicated, and ASEAN countries have good reason to be concerned about the possible consequences for maritime routes and global supply lines in the event of a protracted Japan-China conflict. South Korea must maintain a balance between deterrence and its economic relations with China and between its alliance with the United States. Japan must aim to achieve ASEAN unity and avoid securitising the EU’s economic relations with the region. It can do this by entering into a direct dialogue with the capitals of the ASEAN countries in order to strengthen marine surveillance and carry out humanitarian aid projects.

Domestically, the responsibility for burden-sharing of domestic defence expenses will have to be borne by the Tokyo government, by securing understanding from domestic actors, by developing dual-use technologies, and by achieving adequate parliamentary transparency. It is also important that Japanese society understands that defence is good for trade and for disaster prevention. For Japan to develop a defence strategy that can truly succeed, it will have to achieve the aim of deterrence through means of diplomacy that strengthen confidence, to avert a crisis from arising in the first place.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Casimiro, C. (2026). Japan prepares to deploy Type-12 long-range anti-ship missiles. The Defence Post. 

Choi, S. H. (2026). China–Japan military tensions: What lies ahead in 2026? South China Morning Post. 

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