The Abraham Accords did not fail, but they also did not create the transformative new Middle Eastern order that many had hoped for — a broader pro-Western, anti-Iran bloc never materialized.

The region is moving toward strategic flexibility and multi-alignment rather than rigid blocs, with key players like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Turkey hedging between the US, China, and others.

The Palestinian issue remains central — the Gaza war exposed the limits of normalization and showed that Arab governments are unwilling to fully separate cooperation with Israel from progress on Palestinian statehood.

The Abraham Accords did not fail. But they also did not deliver what many expected them to produce: a fundamentally new Middle Eastern order.

For a brief period, policymakers in Washington and parts of the region viewed the agreements as the beginning of a structural realignment. Arab states would normalize relations with Israel, coordinate more openly against Iran, and gradually anchor a more stable regional order supported by the United States. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain moved first. Morocco and Sudan followed. Saudi Arabia appeared to be edging in the same direction.

That broader vision has not materialized.

The Accords remain an important diplomatic achievement, but the wider political architecture associated with them has stalled. Rather than consolidating into a coherent pro-American, Arab-Israeli bloc, the Middle East has evolved toward a more fluid regional environment characterized by hedging, multi-alignment, and strategic flexibility.

The Gaza war did not create this shift. It exposed underlying structural constraints that had always been present.

From the outset, normalization rested on a difficult assumption: that Arab governments could deepen strategic ties with Israel while containing public concern over the unresolved........

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