If a future agreement between the United States and Iran fails, it will not be because diplomacy is inherently flawed. It will fail because of structural contradictions embedded in the geopolitical architecture surrounding it — particularly the continued reliance on Pakistan as a strategic intermediary.

The recent suggestion that Pakistan could host or mediate U.S.–Iran negotiations is not merely surprising; it is strategically concerning. It reflects a persistent tendency in U.S. foreign policy to elevate Pakistan’s role beyond what its historical conduct justifies.

For decades, Pakistan has operated within a strategic framework often described as “strategic depth.” In theory, this doctrine seeks to provide security buffers. In practice, it has frequently translated into influence through non-state actors, regional leverage, and calibrated instability.

This is not a new phenomenon.

During the Cold War, Pakistan became the central conduit for U.S. and allied support to Afghan fighters under Operation Cyclone. The program succeeded in its immediate objective: contributing to Soviet withdrawal. However, it also created a vast infrastructure of militant networks, training pipelines, and ideological mobilization that would outlast the conflict itself.

These networks did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. They evolved, adapted, and in many cases became central actors in subsequent regional conflicts.

In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan once again positioned itself as indispensable. It became a frontline ally in the war on terror, receiving substantial financial and military assistance from the United States. Yet throughout this period, concerns persisted regarding selective counterterrorism policies, militant safe havens, and the distinction........

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