The author treats the 15 September North Arabian Sea contact between PNS Hunain and an Indian warship as a seamanship failure, not only a diplomatic row. Indian sources say Hunain closed at speed and crossed the Indian ship’s path on a surveillance task. India reported no major damage or injuries; Hunain was said to be damaged and headed for harbour. MEA protested and cited the 1991 pact’s Article 10—at least three nautical miles between the two navies’ ships and subs in international waters.

Precedent named: 2011, PNS Babur and INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden during the MV Suez hijack case. India said Babur came in from astern and nicked Godavari’s helo-deck net; Pakistan blamed Indian manoeuvring. Two contacts in 15 years, the piece says, are hard to treat as one-offs.

Contrast drawn with Indian Navy rescue work: January 2024 MV Lila Norfolk (21 crew); March 2024 Iranian-flagged Al-Kambar 786—23 Pakistani sailors saved after pirates surrendered to INS Sumedha and Trishul. Close: professionalism is also staying off the other ship.

The sea leaves little room for bad seamanship. Speed, distance, communication and predictable manoeuvring are not technicalities when warships operate in close proximity. They are the basics that prevent a routine encounter from becoming a dangerous one.

That is what makes the PNS Hunain collision in the North Arabian Sea worth examining beyond the immediate diplomatic fallout. It did not happen in a historical vacuum. There is already a significant precedent involving an Indian and Pakistani warship, unsafe manoeuvring and physical contact. And there is a striking contrast on the other side: the Indian Navy has spent years operating in these waters on maritime-security........

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