Referring to Indonesia’s Ministry Foreign Affairs 2025-2029 strategic master plan (RENSTRA), BRICS is intended as a platform for inclusive dialogue in order to create a multilateral system and global order that is more representative, while also championing developing countries interest and bridge differences with developed countries. In retrospect, Indonesia’s position to take an active position in BRICS is indeed needed. BRICS requires a middle power that is able to serve as an intermediary to position the institution as a champion of development for the developing countries, and anchor BRICS not as a tool for competing actor interest in politics. Without the role of middle power to bridge this, the group effort may be perceived as a threat instead of a common platform between developing and developed countries. Referencing prior case of BRICS push for de-dollarization. The movement was taken as a threat with the US threatening a punitive measure to countries that support the idea.

In comparison Indonesia was able to push for a similar goal through the function of local currency settlement initiatives in nurturing resilience against volatility from dollar as a settlement during its chairmanship in G20 instead. Even in the context of non-US membership, such as the ASEAN plus three arrangement, a similar initiative for reducing reliance on one currency of the dollar for settlement was able to be discussed without the reactive punitive measures from concerning parties similar to the case of BRICS. These initiatives were able to frame alternatives to reliance with dollars, while maintaining pro-development orientation in their overall goal. Both cases clearly highlight that initiatives pertaining for development require actors to protect them from politicization, which positions the middle power role into important actors. Indonesia’s role is important as it needs to be the intermediaries that are able to translate BRICS not as a political threat for its members and guarantee the institution role in pursuant of development.

The potential role of Indonesia as bridge maker was seen when Indonesia was able to balance the BRICS position alongside other middle power actors such as India and Brazil by re-interpreting the de-dolarization angle taken by BRICS. A potential route by Indonesia includes interpreting de-dollarization as a risk management initiative through diversification of settlement options. This approach could cushion shocks from relying on a single system, prevent crisis contagion, and robustness against forex volatility. Indonesia’s previous record within G20 and ASEAN on this matter could serve as reference to Indonesia’s capacity to bring this framework in BRICS as well.

Likewise one other potential observation is on how Indonesia could play a balancing part in future politically risky initiatives of BRICS that may otherwise be perceived as geopolitical framing and the use of technical finance into power politics. Instead, BRICS as a platform could be utilized for an inclusivity agenda through introduction and integration of technology and innovation. Taking into context the emerging discussion of BRICS led cross border payment scheme, one may observe how Indonesia could highlight the role of interoperability as an inclusive finance initiative. While declarations guiding BRICS to pursue financial inclusivity have already been promulgated in various declarations, the addition of Indonesia could serve as an alternative guiding force to the feasibility to support financial inclusiveness in a practical sense. One view that the media had highlighted is how Indonesia may contribute through Indonesia’s QRIS as a model of QR code based integration in the BRICS DCMS (Decentralized cross border messaging system) pilot and interoperability scheme. 

While other similar fast payment systems (FPS) platforms within BRICS members are also available as reference, QRIS may play an important role. Its design covers only the initial payment initiation/interface layer, enabling the system to be built on top of different settlement infrastructure of participant countries. While capable only in the first layer of transaction, referencing Indonesia experience, the scheme may serve as functions in guarding payment limit through transaction caps up to IDR 10 million equivalent (around 600-650 Dollars). This mechanism also helps filter transactions with appropriate risk levels, while focusing on transactions that expand and empower MSME access tor cross border exposure. Indonesian participation could therefore be beneficial in safeguarding BRICS role in inclusive finance and in leveraging technology to promote collective mutual development between members rather than political intention.

As observed, an engagement window in BRICS is needed to allow for intermediary actors to exercise the ability to frame policies accordingly. Especially as policies are prone to be translated as political tools during sensitive times.The absence of such intermediary roles risks positioning BRICS primarily as a political channel and shows less commitment and guarantee of the institution’s capacity to protect development interests. BRICS relevance is strengthened when actors could rely on the platform to filter political factors in exchange for the pursuit of mutual development. A guardian role of middle powers is therefore needed to sustain BRICS as a future platform that ensures continuity of mutual cooperation between the developing and developed country needs despite emerging new geopolitical interests. A reminder that while political interest may change over time but development needs of its members remain constant.

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