The author treats the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden fight as more than Yemen: Bab el-Mandeb sits between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, so Houthi attacks on shipping give Iran leverage beside Hormuz and threaten Saudi’s southern flank and UAE port networks.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi both want Iran contained and lanes open, but the piece says their local allies and priorities often clash. The Horn then absorbs a rivalry it did not design.

Djibouti lives on bases and logistics and fears becoming a target; Somalia on arms flows and militants; Eritrea on how much foreign force to allow; Ethiopia on access to the sea. Gulf money in African ports can bring investment or imported competition. Geography, in this telling, is no longer backdrop.

The expanding war in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is not merely an extension of the conflict in Yemen but is a part of a wider geopolitical struggle linking the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Horn.

The strategic importance of this maritime corridor derives from its position between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, with the Bab el-Mandeb Strait serving as a critical gateway for international trade and energy flows. For the Gulf states, instability in the Red Sea represents a direct challenge to regional security, economic diversification and maritime commerce. For the Horn States, however, the same conflict is viewed through concerns about sovereignty, port competition, economic dependence, militarisation and the spillover of Middle Eastern rivalries into African territory.

For the Gulf states, the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen has transformed the Red........

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