Bangladesh stands at a rare and delicate historical juncture. After years marked by heavyhanded governance, systemic corruption, and widespread humanrights abuses, the political order that dominated national life for more than a decade has finally collapsed under the weight of its own excesses. Numerous Bangladeshis experienced suffering that cannot be easily erased: extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, political intimidation, and the dismantling of institutional checks on executive authority. The state’s sovereignty and dignity suffered further from deeply unpopular policies that appeared to bend national interests in favor of external powers. This long catalogue of grievances generated a powerful and understandable public sentiment that the leaders and operatives of the former regime should be held to account before being permitted to reenter normal political life.

In this context, the exclusion of the previous ruling party (Awami League) from the forthcoming elections—though regretted by some who preferred to see them defeated electorally—was not surprising. Many citizens did not wish to see individuals widely associated with abuses simply return to the public stage without any reckoning. Yet their exclusion alone does not resolve the larger challenge of rebuilding a democratic order in which elections are not merely symbolic exercises, but meaningful expressions of the popular will. Instead, the ban has led major political actors to adopt indirect strategies, including urging their followers to support aligned “Bteam” alternatives. Other parties with their own histories of moral and political shortcomings have attempted to reposition themselves as vehicles for protest votes. These dynamics reveal a fundamental fragility within Bangladesh’s electoral landscape: the absence of a unified, principled, meritbased political culture.

It is in this vacuum that civil society emerges as the most essential force capable of steering the nation toward a credible democratic transition. Yet any discussion of civil society’s potential must begin with a sober acknowledgement of its own historical shortcomings. For decades, much of Bangladesh’s civic establishment—comprised of prominent NGOs, intellectual circles, professional bodies, and mediaadjacent networks—operated not as an independent moral force but as an accessory to the prevailing power structure. Rather than reflecting the aspirations of ordinary citizens, segments of this sphere aligned themselves with elite interests, foreign hegemonic narratives, and selfserving ideological projects that had limited resonance with the broader public. As a result, civil society often appeared detached from grassroots realities while benefiting from proximity to authoritarian administrations and entrenched elements of the Deep State. When corruption infiltrates a system,........

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