In the early hours of 17 August 2026, two explosive drones struck the private office of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and the residence of the head of Parastin, the KRG’s intelligence agency, in Erbil. The Kurdistan Counter-Terrorism Service said the drones, identified as Iranian-origin Hadid-110 loitering munitions, were launched from Iranian territory. Barzani condemned the strike as a threat to the region’s stability and directly pointed at Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, denied responsibility on X, warning of ‘false-flag ploys’ meant to sow discord.

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The strike advances through Kurdish political ranks, from opposition camps to KDP leaders’ residences during the February, April war, ending at the prime minister’s office. But it is not just a war against armed groups or any single one. None of the exiled parties in Iran’s sights, PDKI, Komala, PJAK, PAK, has waged a sustained offensive campaign against Iran in over a decade, and most of the campaign’s victims have had no connection to any of them. The attacks are on organisational capacity in the broadest sense: the demonstrated ability of Kurdish networks, armed, unarmed, familial, cultural, to mobilise a domestic public. Therefore, the attacks inside the Kurdistan Region and the executions, killings, and disappearances inside Iran are two sides of the same coin.

Iran’s campaign started weeks before the US-Israeli strikes on 28 February 2026, triggered by Kurdish civil mobilisation. On 5 January, Kurdish parties called for a general strike, which spread across over fifty towns in Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam provinces. Towns like Abdanan and Malekshahi reportedly slipped from state control as security withdrew. One party, PAK, later........

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