Analyses of the April 7, 2026 “Cheng–Xi meeting” risk falling into a conceptual blind spot: interpreting the encounter between the two party leaders through the lens of seeking peace or stability, while overlooking a crucial reality, namely that the Kuomintang (KMT) is not an actor capable of engaging the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on equal strategic footing. Alas, this oversight carries significant danger, as it may push Taiwan toward greater insecurity rather than safety. Taiwan is a democracy and a resilient small state, but it is by no means a great power. In fact, Taiwan remains highly exposed to risk. Its critical strategic position means that, when facing the CCP regime that has never renounced the use of force, Taiwan must constantly think in terms of danger even in times of apparent calm. Accordingly, the central question is not whether “engagement” can bring peace or stability across the Strait, but rather how a structurally disadvantaged Taiwan can interact with a relatively advantaged authoritarian regime without undermining its own security. Historical experience suggests that for small states operating under unfavorable security conditions, engaging with a great power that denies their very subjecthood often produces counterproductive outcomes, leaving them more, not less, vulnerable (Kaufman, 1992; Labs, 1992; Christensen, 1997; Chasek, 2005).

The fundamental problem with the “Cheng–Xi meeting” is not simply that it is risky for the leader of Taiwan’s opposition party to meet with the head of the CCP. Rather, even if the KMT were the ruling party in Taiwan, such a meeting would still entail substantial risks. What the “Cheng–Xi meeting” ultimately reveals is a deeper pathological syndrome within Taiwan’s perspective of security: a preference for symbolic reassurance over substantive action, and a tendency to equate cross-Strait “engagement” with peace-keeping or stability-making (Janis, 1972; Jervis, 1976; Stein, 1982). This pathology reflects a mistaken belief that high-level meetings with the CCP leaders contribute more to safeguarding national security than the sustained accumulation of Taiwan’s own capabilities (Chang Liao, 2012).

Structural Asymmetry across the Taiwan Strait

The Taiwan Strait is not merely a geographically defined space fraught with political contention; it is, more fundamentally, an asymmetric strategic environment shaped by three mutually reinforcing gaps.

First, there is a gap in material power. The CCP holds a clear advantage in both military scale and economic capacity, enabling it to steadily compress Taiwan’s strategic room and geopolitical space. Second, there is a hierarchical gap in the structure of interaction. In most instances, Beijing dominates the terms of engagement with Taipei. Nearly every cross-strait issue is framed or manipulated by Beijing as one of a hierarchical relationship between China and Taiwan, in which Beijing assumes the role of the superior actor while Taipei is cast in a subordinate position (Lin, 2022). Third, there is a disparity in narrative power. Although the authorities in Taipei do not exercise actual jurisdiction over mainland China, and the authorities in Beijing likewise do not exercise actual jurisdiction over Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the way these realities are framed in both domestic politics and international relations creates a profound asymmetry (Chen, 2022). Taiwan’s de facto independence is consistently overshadowed, and often constrained, by the controversy surrounding the de jure independence of Taiwan. As a result, a polity that is, in practice, already independent remains unable to ignore the political and legal weight of the “One China” issue. By the same logic, however, why is it that the government of the People’s Republic of China, which is legally constituted as an independent entity, has never been required to offer a detailed explanation for its claim that Taiwan—over which the CCP has exercised no authority since its founding in 1949—is nevertheless part of “China”? Put differently, why is a de facto independent Taiwan expected to justify why it is not yet recognized as a de jure independent state, while the PRC, despite never having de facto governed Taiwan, is not held to the same standard of explanation regarding its de jure claim to the island? If these questions are left unaddressed, or deliberately set aside, any discussion or practice of cross-Strait relations will be logically inconsistent and, more importantly, fundamentally unfair to Taiwan.

In an environment shaped by the intersection of the three structural asymmetries mentioned above, cross-Strait “engagement” resembles what the scholar David Shambaugh has described as Beijing’s deliberate strategy of selective interaction and the transmission of political signals (Shambaugh, 2004/2005). Beneath this approach lies a dense web of CCP’s calculation and tactical maneuvering, rather than any genuine pursuit of........

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