The Liberal International Order (LIO) put in place in the aftermath of WWII is facing unprecedented challenges. Trump has attacked traditional allies while actively working to undermine the logic of the entire multilateral system. His administration sustains that the heightened interdependence of the last thirty years has gone astray, that traditional outsiders, like such as China and much of the so-called Global South, have rigged the system, and that an aggressive unilateralist approach, based on the notion that might makes right, is necessary to reset the normal international hierarchy of power. Other powerful nations may follow suit, which would likely inflame tensions across the globe, but this is not a viable option for most countries whose prospects would be increasingly dependent on the whims and actions of stronger states.

Undeniably, the multilateral structures created by the LIO did not equitably address the needs of both industrialized and developing societies. But it was at least partially within these new arenas for global representation and deliberation created after 1945 that emerging nations in the south managed to advance their needs and demands on the global stage, though often by pushing the boundaries and redefining the role and operation of these same institutions. These efforts were complex and multidimensional, and gains were unevenly shared. And it is clear by now that the enlargement of the agenda of multilateral agencies to include themes, such as development and unfair trade, came only as a response to the assertive and independent mobilization of nations of the decolonized world.

After all, it was only after the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in September 1961, that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) decided to host its first Conference on Trade and Development, in the spring of 1964, leading to the creation of a new international agency (the UNCTAD) focused on addressing development concerns of what was then referred to as the Third World. Brazil’s independent foreign policy at that time – known as Política Externa Independente (PEB) – allowed Latin America’s largest nation to play an important role in this process, though it would never join the NAM. Alternatively, even though a US-supported, right-wing military coup, in March the same year, curtailed the fulfillment of its autonomist approach, Brazil would become a central actor within the Group 77, a coalition of developing nations created at the first UNCTAD meeting. Brazil’s engagement in the G77 reflected its long-standing commitment to multilateralism and its broader foreign policy objective of reshaping the international development agenda, increasingly by promoting South-South cooperation.

Though a central focus of its foreign policy, Brazil continued pursuit of a sovereign diplomatic path has not been easy as the country consistently faced challenges in seeking to promote the interests of a rising economy given the constraints imposed by US hegemony in the Western hemisphere. Given this constrained context, Brazilian elites historically perceived........

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