While the 21st century represents a period in which Asia is rising and the balance of power is shifting from West to East, two major actors stand out at the center of this rise: China and India. The relations between these two nuclear powers carry both potential for cooperation and structural tensions in historical, geopolitical, economic and strategic terms. This article focuses on questions such as whether China sees India as a threat, India’s role in the US-China rivalry, whether China aims for hegemony or regional superiority, and whether the rivalry between these two powers will inevitably end in conflict. Such questions are addressed in a context where China’s historical strategic culture and India’s post-colonial quest for strategic autonomy collide. China’s historical superiority perception based on the “Middle Kingdom” understanding and India’s diplomatic tradition shaped by the principle of “non-alignment” fundamentally affect the ways in which the two countries perceive each other. Therefore, focusing not only on current strategic developments but also on historical memories is essential to understanding the Sino-Indian rivalry.

Although China-India relations have historically been built on common ties such as Buddhism and trade, they have been marked by competition and conflict in the modern nation-state. After India declared independence in 1947 and China was established as the People’s Republic in 1949, a friendly atmosphere was established in the early years under the slogan “India and China are brothers”, but this atmosphere was permanently shattered by the 1962 War. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 broke out when border disputes in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions escalated to a military dimension and resulted in a major defeat for India. This war is the historical basis for the current geopolitical uncertainty and insecurity. Although normalization steps were taken in the 1980s and 1990s, the border line (Line of Actual Control – LAC) between the two countries has still not been clarified. Events such as the 2020 Galwan Valley conflict have shown how active these historical fault lines remain. Behind this historical tension lies not only border disputes, but also the narratives that the two countries use to construct their national identities. While China emphasizes its liberation from the “hundred-year humiliation” of the 19th century and its resurgence, India sees its struggle for independence against British colonialism as the basis of national pride. This situation further strengthens both countries’ perceptions of external threats and feeds the need to increase their strategic autonomy.

In order to better understand this historical process, it is necessary to look at the border definitions during the Qing Dynasty and the British Empire. In particular, the McMahon Line, drawn by the British at the Simla Conference in 1914 and based on India’s current position, has never been officially recognized by China. China has rejected this line, arguing that it was an imposition of Western imperialist powers, and different approaches to the status of Tibet have created additional tensions between the parties. Therefore, the 1962 War can be read not only as a military conflict between two modern states, but also as a challenge to post-colonial border arrangements. The two countries’ approach to border disputes is also closely related to the internal political dynamics of the states. While China, especially under the increasing influence of nationalist public opinion, defines the issue of territorial integrity as an uncompromising red line, in India, similarly, control of the border regions is important in terms of national honor and political legitimacy. In this context, even a small tactical gain or loss on the LAC can have major strategic and political consequences.

The rising wave of nationalism in the public opinion of both countries after the conflict in the Galwan Valley has made it even more difficult to step back. In addition, the border disputes reveal the different military strategy and logistics approaches of China and India. China has greatly improved its transportation and infrastructure capabilities on its western border and has reached the capacity to conduct rapid military buildup in the region. In contrast, India has more difficulty in reaching the border regions due to geographical conditions, which directly affects the deterrence capacity of the Indian army. This infrastructure difference makes it easier for China to make more aggressive maneuvers on the LAC line. Finally, the difficulty of resolving these historical tensions in terms of international law and border agreements further complicates the issue. Despite the border agreements signed in 1993, 1996 and 2005, the parties have not reached a common agreement on where exactly the LAC passes. China and India’s different perceptions of the LAC cause the de facto areas of control to constantly change and these changes to sometimes turn into violent clashes.

Although China’s foreign policy approach is often defined by criticisms of Western-centered hegemony and the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs”, this understanding has evolved into a more proactive and strategic framework with the Xi Jinping era. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is considered as an attempt to expand China’s sphere of influence through trade and infrastructure lines between Asia-Germany-Africa. In this complex strategy, India is an active center of resistance to China’s regional projects. India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Belt-Road Initiative is perceived by China as an obstacle to regional integration. Moreover, India’s participation in anti-China alliances such as QUAD (USA, Japan, Australia, India) is interpreted by Beijing as a threat of “encirclement”. However, it cannot be said that China sees India as its primary threat. China’s priorities are Taiwan, the South China Sea and its competitive ground with the US.

When China’s foreign policy doctrines are examined, the concept of the “China Dream” expressed by Xi Jinping in particular reveals that China desires to re-establish its historical superiority. In the foreign policy aspect of this dream, China aims to create secure spheres of influence, build alternative structures to Western institutions (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), and maintain a permanent military presence in strategic regions. India finds many of these goals to be contrary to its own interests and perceives them as threats to regional balance. China’s perception of India is shaped as a regional power seeking strategic autonomy rather than a purely military or economic........

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