*Originally published in 2025 and preserved as part of our archive project.Get E-International Relations delivered directly to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work.

Three and a half years into Russia’s war, Moscow has failed to win – but the West has also failed to craft a winning strategy. Although Moscow has failed to achieve its initial objectives – such as a rapid invasion of entire Ukraine, quick victory, and regime change in Kyiv – it is equally important to recognize that the West’s strategy of decisively defeating Russia has also fallen short. The war has reached a painful stalemate, and both sides face limits to their ambitions. This war has exposed Russia’s miscalculations and poor strategy, as well as the West’s weaknesses – struggling with problems it has no clear tools to manage, despite long-held faith in its strength. Russia entered the conflict with considerable confidence. This assurance was not baseless but rooted in Moscow’s earlier achievements and the world’s quiet responses to them. The 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea both resulted in minimal costs for Moscow. Similarly, Russia’s willingness to provoke and sustain conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and other post-Soviet states reinforced the belief that it could act with relative impunity.

Even earlier, during the brutal campaigns in Chechnya in the mid-1990s and again in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russia faced international condemnation but suffered no real consequences. Western governments issued sharp rhetoric, but effective sanctions never followed, and Moscow continued to exercise significant influence across the post-Soviet space. These weak responses to Russian aggression strengthened Vladimir Putin’s confidence and convinced him that Western threats rarely translated into action. Moreover, Russia’s position in the global system was ambiguous. It was neither fully integrated into Western structures, despite President Yeltsin’s overtures in the 1990s, nor entirely excluded. This in-between status provided space for maneuver. When President Putin decided to invade Ukraine in February 2022, he had good reason to assume the West would hesitate to have military contact with Russia directly, particularly given Europe’s deep dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. Whether his calculations were ultimately correct or not, Putin entered the war believing Western countries lacked the will to confront Russia strongly or jeopardize their own economic interests.

The West’s reaction, while eventually more significant than Russia anticipated, was far from prompt or unified. European energy dependence created fractures, with some countries initially reluctant to support strong measures. Germany, for instance, hesitated to abandon Russian natural gas, while Hungary openly resisted several sanction packages. These differences slowed decision-making at crucial early moments. The United States and European Union did impose sweeping sanctions and provide Ukraine........

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