The recent interview published in Dhaka-based Bangla newspaper Kaler Kantho has placed Bangladesh at the center of an extraordinary constitutional debate. Speaking on record, President Mohammad Shahabuddin described what he portrayed as a sustained effort by the Yunus-led interim government to sideline the presidency, ignore constitutional mandates, and contemplate extra-constitutional restructuring of state authority. These are not minor allegations born of political rivalry; they strike at the structural integrity of the Republic’s constitutional framework. If examined strictly within the four corners of the Constitution of Bangladesh, the issues raised carry serious legal consequences.

Bangladesh’s Constitution establishes a parliamentary form of government, yet it does not render the President ornamental or irrelevant. Articles 48 through 54 define the President as the constitutional head of state and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Executive authority may be exercised by the Prime Minister or, in transitional contexts, a Chief Adviser, but such authority operates within constitutional limits and in coordination with the President. The Constitution is explicit in Article 7: it is the supreme law of the Republic, and any action inconsistent with it is void.

According to the President’s account, the Chief Adviser repeatedly undertook foreign visits—reportedly more than a dozen—without informing or consulting the President. Major state agreements, including those with the United States, were allegedly concluded without written or oral briefing to the Head of State. If accurate, this conduct is not a matter of etiquette; it is a breach of constitutional obligation. Constitutional governance is not merely about formal powers but about procedural fidelity. The President’s role in being informed of state affairs, especially foreign engagements, is embedded in constitutional convention and legal expectation. A deliberate failure to communicate state decisions may amount to administrative misconduct and violation of constitutional duty.

The President went further, stating that Yunus “did not care about the Constitution.” Such a declaration from the Head of State is legally consequential. Article 7A of the Constitution criminalizes any attempt to suspend, subvert, or abrogate the Constitution through unconstitutional means. The provision was inserted precisely to prevent executive or military adventurism that bypasses lawful procedure. If there were efforts to remove the President outside the constitutional framework of Article 52—which prescribes impeachment by Parliament with specific majorities—then those efforts would be constitutionally void and potentially criminal.

The interview contains a particularly serious allegation: that an attempt was made to replace the President through unconstitutional means by installing a former Chief Justice. Even if unsuccessful, conspiracy to displace a constitutional office outside lawful procedure may fall within the scope of subversion. The Constitution does not tolerate improvisation in matters of succession. Removal of the President must occur strictly through impeachment by Parliament. Any deviation would constitute an affront to constitutional supremacy and could invite charges ranging from conspiracy to treason, depending on evidentiary findings.

Equally troubling are the institutional measures allegedly taken to marginalize the presidency. The removal of the President’s portrait from foreign missions, obstruction of his foreign visits, withdrawal of his press wing, and suppression of official communications collectively suggest an effort to symbolically and administratively incapacitate the office. In constitutional jurisprudence, systematic obstruction of a constitutional office can amount to constructive removal. While the President remained formally in office, the described actions may have sought to render him functionally invisible.

The presidency represents the sovereignty of the State. Diplomatic protocol across the world recognizes the Head of State as the embodiment of national authority. Removing presidential representation from embassies without lawful basis may constitute ultra vires administrative action. Similarly, blocking official communications or preventing the President from performing ceremonial and constitutional duties could violate statutory provisions governing public administration and foreign affairs. Such actions, if proven to be motivated by political hostility rather than legal necessity, would fall under the doctrine of mala fide exercise of power.

The interview also alludes to concerns regarding external diplomatic involvement. While the President noted that foreign diplomatic circles opposed unconstitutional removal, any substantiated collusion with external actors to alter Bangladesh’s constitutional order would raise the gravest possible legal implications. Sovereignty rests with the people of Bangladesh, and Article 7A treats attempts to subvert that sovereignty with utmost severity. Collusion with foreign entities to manipulate constitutional authority could meet the threshold of treason under constitutional and penal provisions.

Against this backdrop, the role of the Bangladesh Armed Forces and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party assumes constitutional significance. The President credited both institutions with resisting unconstitutional pressure. The Armed Forces, constitutionally subordinate to civilian authority yet bound to defend the Constitution, reportedly declined to support any unlawful removal. Their stance reflects institutional loyalty to constitutional order rather than to any individual. In fragile democracies, such institutional restraint often marks the difference between crisis and collapse.

Similarly, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s refusal to endorse extra-constitutional removal underscores the role of political actors in preserving constitutional continuity. Constitutionalism is sustained not only by written provisions but by political choices. When major parties choose procedural legitimacy over short-term advantage, the constitutional framework survives.

The path forward, however, cannot rely solely on retrospective gratitude. If the allegations articulated by the President are supported by evidence, accountability must proceed through lawful channels. A judicial commission under the supervision of the Supreme Court could investigate the alleged constitutional violations. Where evidence establishes conspiracy or abuse of authority, prosecution under Article 7A and relevant penal statutes may be warranted. Parliament retains authority to conduct inquiries into executive misconduct. Immigration restrictions, travel limitations, or investigative holds could be imposed during inquiry to preserve jurisdiction and prevent evasion. Any financial or diplomatic correspondence suggesting unlawful collusion must be scrutinized with procedural fairness.

The alleged violations carry severe constitutional and criminal penalties under Bangladeshi law. Any attempt to unconstitutionally remove the President violates Article 7A, constituting sedition punishable by the highest penalties, potentially death or life imprisonment. Criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Penal Code attracts equivalent punishment to the intended crime. Administrative actions obstructing the presidency may be declared void by the Supreme Court.

The due process remains the cornerstone of constitutional justice. The objective is not retribution but restoration of constitutional supremacy. Bangladesh’s constitutional history has endured episodes of interruption and amendment; it has also demonstrated resilience. The present allegations, if substantiated, would represent not merely administrative disagreement but a structural challenge to constitutional governance.

Democracies seldom fall in dramatic strokes. They weaken when constitutional guardrails are treated as obstacles rather than safeguards. If an executive authority disregards the Constitution, marginalizes the Head of State, and contemplates extra-constitutional succession, the law provides remedies. Those remedies are deliberate, institutional, and severe—not because personalities demand punishment, but because constitutional order demands preservation.

The interview published in Kaler Kantho has ignited more than a political controversy. It has opened a constitutional inquiry. Whether that inquiry leads to prosecution, parliamentary scrutiny, or judicial clarification, the guiding principle must remain unambiguous: in Bangladesh, no officeholder stands above the Constitution. The supremacy of law is not rhetorical ornamentation; it is the Republic’s foundation. If that foundation was tested, it must now be reinforced—through lawful investigation, transparent adjudication, and unwavering commitment to constitutional fidelity.

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