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Chandigarh: For over two decades, successive governments in New Delhi have proclaimed the United States as India’s “major defence partner” and presented their expanding relationship as a defining pillar of the country’s strategic engagement with Washington.

But, in the area New Delhi values most – the acquisition of the industrial capabilities needed to build an indigenous defence industrial base – the US has proved less forthcoming than Russia, France and Israel, which, to varying degrees, have displayed greater willingness to support technology transfer, local manufacturing and indigenous capability development.

Together with the US, these three countries have, over the years, supplied the overwhelming majority of India’s imported military capability, ranging from fighter, transport, and tanker aircraft, submarines, assorted warships and helicopters to tanks, missiles, small arms, radars, electronic warfare systems, drones, and precision-guided weapons. 

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), during 2020–2024 Russia remained India’s largest materiel supplier, accounting for around 36% of major arms imports, followed closely by France at around 33%, while the US accounted for approximately 13% and Israel around 10%.

However, the significance of this quartet of India’s principal materiel suppliers cannot be measured merely by the volume of equipment provided: it lies equally in the different models of defence cooperation they represent.

Russia, France and Israel have generally combined arms transfers with varying degrees of production assistance, technical collaboration and technology access.

Also read: Russia’s Shadow over India-US Defence Ties

In contrast, the US defence industry remains constrained by complex export-control regulations, compliance requirements and intellectual-property protections, among numerous other regulatory and legal constraints. 

The reasons lie largely in the structure of the US defence industry and its technology-transfer regime. US defence companies operate within one of the world’s most restrictive frameworks, governed by regulations like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), stringent end-use monitoring requirements, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) and related controls.

Together, these strict structures impose rigorous security obligations on overseas contractors and subcontractors handling sensitive military-related technical information, including controlled designs, specifications and production data. 

Unlike Russia’s state-directed military sector, where the government can directly shape defence-industrial cooperation, or France, which has generally shown greater flexibility on manufacturing partnerships, the US model places far greater authority in the hands of private corporations that remain protective of closely held know-how and cautious about entering deeper technology-sharing arrangements.

Also read: The Long-Delayed Proposal For Integrated Theatre Commands and Its Many Pitfalls

Consequently, the outcome has been a persistent disconnect in Indo-US defence relations between ambitious political rhetoric and the near absence of the industrial capability transfer needed to advance India’s pursuit of atmanirbharta, or greater self-reliance in the defence sector. 

Such limited progress, however, has not prevented the Modi government from investing unprecedented diplomatic capital in strengthening the broader strategic partnership with Washington.

Much of that effort has focused on embedding India more firmly within Washington’s evolving regional security architecture and aligning the two countries more closely in responding to the challenges posed by China’s growing hegemony.

Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP-led) government, for instance, enthusiastically embraced the US-backed Indo-Pacific construct, placed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) at the centre of India’s maritime security engagement with the US, Japan and Australia, and signed and expanded the four foundational bilateral military agreements governing logistics support, secure communications, geospatial intelligence and information sharing between Delhi and Washington.

These initiatives represented the core pillars of India’s strategic alignment with Washington, but their future direction has become increasingly uncertain.

The Trump administration’s decision to revert the US Indo-Pacific Command to its historical designation as US Pacific Command (USPACOM) – undoing the 2018 name change that reflected the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region –has added to questions over Washington’s long-term commitment to the framework.

Similarly, the QUAD too has lost momentum, with uncertainty over Washington’s regional priorities, differing threat perceptions among its members and questions over sustained political........

© The Wire