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Last week, the research institute Citizen Lab revealed that the mobile phone of Boniface Mwangi – a photojournalist, prominent opposition activist, and candidate in Kenya’s 2027 presidential election – had been hacked using a system developed by the Israeli company Cellebrite.

Mwangi’s phone was seized by authorities when he was arrested in July 2025 over his involvement in protests against the government of President William Ruto. The mass protests erupted in response to violence by security forces, including extrajudicial killings, as well as the government’s widespread corruption. Addressing the investigation and subsequent media inquiries, Cellebrite said it works to prevent the misuse of its technology and invited anyone making such claims to contact the company directly with substantiated evidence, but did not announce any changes to its operations in Kenya.

The alleged involvement of a private Israeli company in the persecution of Kenya’s opposition is yet another example of the evolution of Israel’s role in internal repression worldwide – from activities carried out primarily by official state bodies and government-owned companies to operations conducted by private firms operating under licenses issued by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The use of private companies is intended to obscure responsibility and create the false impression that the State of Israel bears none. Yet Israel did not revoke Cellebrite’s operating license in Kenya following the Citizen Lab investigation – just as it has not done so in the wake of serious investigative findings in other countries.

In Kenya in particular, Israeli Foreign Ministry files from the 1980s concerning relations with the authoritarian regime of Daniel arap Moi – opened to the public over the past two years – reveal only the tip of the iceberg of Israeli involvement in the country. While the Mossad was the central actor in these relations and its files remain classified, the Foreign Ministry records nonetheless offer insight into the underlying interests and patterns of conduct that continue to this day.

In a report dated June 4, 1980, Aryeh Oded, head of Israel’s Interests Office in Kenya (operating out of the Danish Embassy in Nairobi), noted that “despite the severing of diplomatic relations in 1973, Israel managed to maintain significant economic and security activities in Kenya, which in some areas were even greater than during the period when an embassy was in operation.” Oded also highlighted the presence of Israeli military experts in Kenya, noting that this continued despite “the death of President Kenyatta, who had a deep affection for Israel and its leaders and a strong disdain for the Arabs, and the rise of Moi, who had no special ties with Israel.”

In a cable sent on December 28, 1980, Israeli Foreign Ministry director-general David Kimche summarised Kenya’s importance to Israel: “Of all the countries in Africa, Kenya is among the most important for us, and the Israeli presence there is among the most impressive. An El Al branch and layovers for flights to South Africa, a Mossad station, defense and other exports worth tens of millions of dollars, and hundreds of Israeli families residing there.”

Mossad’s activities on Kenyan soil

President Moi allowed Israel to carry out activities on Kenyan soil that many other African leaders had refused. Unlike others who occasionally received ad hoc advice or services from the Mossad, Moi permitted the agency to operate a permanent station coordinating its operations across East Africa. Furthermore, the El Al route through Nairobi provided Israel’s only independent direct link to the apartheid regime in South Africa, a key security and economic partner at the time. Moi approved this because of the importance he placed on Israeli support for Kenya’s internal security.

In a cable dated February 24,........

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