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The Defence Forces Vision 2047 document was released by the raksha mantri two weeks back. It has been competently reviewed elsewhere. Implementation contingent on factors outside the military’s domain, a cautionary word for the military has it that ‘the vision risks remaining a powerful prose on paper.’

The scrutiny here begins at the beginning, with the title, in its use of the term ‘defence forces.’ Ten years back, the last edition of the joint doctrine was titled, ‘Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces.’ This, when a strategic partner’s ‘secretary of defence‘ is now the ‘secretary of war!’ A conflation of ‘defence services’ and ‘armed forces’ appears to have resulted in a bastardisation, with none the wiser.

The vision document is heavily caveated. The document is a ‘guideline’ for defence forces, but requires exertion for outcomes also by other stakeholders, such as the scientific community in relation to technical thresholds. In his foreword, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh notes the need for a Defence Vision 2047 as distinct from the Defence Forces 2047. If the document punches above its weight, why did the ministry not take ownership and instead placed the cart before the horse? It also includes aspects yet to be cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security. This confession begs the question: why the hurry?

An answer readily suggests itself: Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Chauhan – whose headquarters wrote it up – is due to retire soon. With little to show for movement on theaterisation – long projected as the core contribution of a CDS – this document must suffice. Therefore, it deems critical interrogation.

The vision document is predicated on a national vision of a Viksit Bharat, which presents India as ‘developed nation’ by 2047. While economists have weighed on its feasibility, critics foreground its implausibility, arguing that it takes more than just economic growth to get there.

Viksit Bharat is in turn predicated on Sashakt Bharat that has ‘absolute sovereignty,’ defined as ‘complete independence in strategic decision making.’ Apparently, India wishes to move further from the hardy ‘strategic autonomy.’ Even if globalization is a holdover from the post-Cold War liberal-internationalist phase, it is improbable that interdependence will reduce, especially when........

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