The ongoing confrontation between Israel and the United States on one side, and Iran on the other, is a multidimensional conflict involving military, intelligence, economic, and cognitive warfare. Although it is too early to determine a final outcome after roughly one month, it is possible to outline an interim balance of power and examine which war objectives have been achieved and which remain elusive.

The central goal for both Israel and the United States has been, first and foremost, the destruction of the Iranian nuclear project and its ballistic missile program, as well as the targeting of the regime’s military infrastructure to destabilize it and seek its collapse. According to information available thus far, American and Israeli airstrikes and special operations have hit strategic facilities and the command-and-control systems of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Significant portions of the missile and drone arrays, which formed the bedrock of Iran’s deterrence strategy, have also been damaged. If the scale of the damage is close to what is being reported, it represents a substantial setback to Iran’s ability to project regional power.

Another achievement for Israel is the degradation of Iran’s regional proxy network. Groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas have suffered severe blows in recent years, both in terms of manpower and infrastructure, leading to a fracture in the “Ring of Fire” strategy that Iran attempted to build around Israel. Nevertheless, the battle against these proxies continues and has not yet reached a stage of absolute resolution; the current focus remains on neutralizing Hezbollah’s missile capabilities in Lebanon.

Despite the aforementioned points, not all objectives have been realized. First, the Iranian regime appears to remain stable, despite the liquidation of many of its key figures. While infrastructure and its image of deterrence have been damaged, the political and security apparatus in Tehran remains functional. Second, the actual extent of the damage to the nuclear program remains unclear. Past experience has shown that facilities can be rebuilt or moved to more fortified locations. Furthermore, the fate of approximately 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% remains ambiguous. Third, Iran’s continued ability to launch missiles and drones toward Israel and other regional states continues to undermine the sense of regional security, indicating that its capabilities have not been fully neutralized.

As for the United States, its achievements are only partial. Washington has succeeded in demonstrating its commitment to its allies, but it is still required to act to ensure freedom of navigation in strategic waterways, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, it has not yet succeeded in persuading other allies to join the fray. In this context, Iran has managed to some extent to shake the stability of the global energy market through its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, though this remains a temporary and limited achievement that may soon be lifted by force.

From Iran’s perspective, the mere survival of the regime and the ability to continue exerting regional pressure are considered achievements in themselves. However, the economic price, the damage to infrastructure, and international isolation have deepened its internal vulnerabilities.

Moving forward, several realistic options face the parties involved:

Continued War of Attrition: Through localized strikes, cyber warfare, and clandestine operations. This is the most likely scenario in the near term, as it allows all parties to avoid a total escalation while attempting to improve their negotiating positions.

Broad Escalation: Involving additional direct attacks on strategic infrastructure in Iran. This scenario could drag the region into a total war and bring new actors into the conflict. For this reason, the US has tried to avoid it thus far, while Israel views it as the better option for a decisive victory, keeping the scenario on the table.

A Return to a New Diplomatic Path: This might include renewed and stricter restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for economic relief. However, the gaps between the parties currently appear too wide for this to materialize in the near future.

In conclusion, the interim balance of power points to numerous tactical achievements for Israel and the United States, but not yet a strategic victory. Iran’s leadership and infrastructure have been damaged, but it has not been subdued. While military superiority over Iran has been significantly bolstered, the armed conflict itself appears far from over. Consequently, we are now observing which of these scenarios the developments will lean toward in the coming period, amid indicators that the end of this battle is not yet in sight.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)