The War Against Iran: Does It Mark the Beginning of a New Middle East?

Geopolitics, Strategic Ruptures, and Regional Reconfiguration

On February 28, 2026, in a joint military operation, the United States and Israel bombed several major cities in Iran. The Israeli operation was named “Roaring Lion,” and the American one, “Epic Fury.” Iran retaliated the same day with Operation Honest Promise 4. Within hours, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attack. For the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, an open and direct war broke out between Israel, the United States, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Middle East, already weakened by years of accumulated tensions, entered a new era whose contours remained uncertain.

This war did not arise from nothing. It is part of a long sequence of escalation that began with the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, continued with the exchanges of airstrikes in 2024, culminated in the Twelve Day War between Israel and then the United States against Iran from June 13 to 24, 2025, and in the American operation “Midnight Hammer” targeting the Iranian nuclear sites of Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Each stage has altered the balance of power, undermined mechanisms of restraint, and reduced diplomatic space to the point that direct confrontation has become inevitable in the eyes of the belligerents.

The question posed by this essay concerns the historical and geopolitical significance of this conflict: does the war against Iran mark the beginning of a new Middle East? The central hypothesis is that this conflict represents a triple rupture—strategic, political, and normative—the effects of which will permanently reshape the regional order. To answer this question, this essay will first analyze the dynamics that led to the war (I), before examining the ongoing transformations within the region (II), then considering the implications for the international order and the uncertainties surrounding the future (III), before updating the analysis in light of the first nineteen days of the conflict (IV and V).

From the “Regional Cold War” to Open Confrontation: The Drivers of a Shift

1.1 A Forty-Five-Year-Old Structural Hostility

The Iranian-Israeli antagonism is not a product of recent circumstances. Since seizing power, the rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran have called for the destruction of the State of Israel. From the very first days of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Khomeini referred to Israel as the “little Satan,” a “cancerous tumor” that must be “wiped off the map.” This hostility was long expressed indirectly, through Iranian support for non-state actors—Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Yemeni Houthis—forming what Iranian doctrine calls the “axis of resistance.” This proxy architecture allowed Tehran to project its power without exposing itself to a direct response, and Israel to inflict blows without triggering a full-scale war.

Iran seeks to expand its political and military influence in the region, while Israel attempts to limit this influence, particularly in the face of Iran’s nuclear program, which it considers a major threat. Thus, even without direct war for a long time, the two states have clashed through allies, clandestine operations, and diplomatic tensions. Since the 2000s, Israel has waged a shadow war against this program — assassinations of scientists, cyberattacks (the Stuxnet virus in 2010), sabotage — while the United States alternated between economic sanctions and diplomatic negotiations, notably the 2015 Vienna agreement (JCPOA), from which the American withdrawal in 2018 under Trump had led Tehran to accelerate its uranium enrichment.

1.2 The Escalation 2023–2025: The Stages of a Flare-Up

The Gaza War of October 2023 was the triggering turning point. By radically undermining Israel’s deterrent posture, Hamas’s attacks forced Israel to respond with considerable force, leading to an unprecedented regional mobilization. Hezbollah opened a “northern front,” Iran increased its arms deliveries to its proxies, and the Houthis disrupted shipping in the Red Sea. In April 2024, Iran launched its first direct strike on Israeli territory, followed by a measured Israeli response. These exchanges broke a taboo: direct confrontation became conceivable.

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a surprise attack against Iran, Operation Rising Lion, targeting key sites of the Iranian nuclear program and their scientists, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iranian air defenses, and energy infrastructure. On the night of June 21-22, 2025, the US Air Force and US Navy launched Operation Midnight Hammer, using B-2 Spirit stealth bombers and Tomahawk missiles to strike Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. This Twelve-Day War ended without Iranian surrender, leaving Tehran humiliated but resilient, and the nuclear issue unresolved.

The winter of 2025-2026 was marked by a dual crisis in Iran: the economic collapse of the rial and a wave of nationwide anti-government protests that were brutally suppressed. On February 27, 2026, Donald Trump stated during a press briefing that the Islamic Republic had “killed at least 32,000 protesters.” It was in this context of internal weakening and indirect nuclear negotiations under Omani auspices—which the Omani mediator present in Geneva described as close to an agreement, with Iran having finally accepted enormous concessions—that the strikes of February 28, 2026, were launched. This paradoxical timing fueled an intense debate about the true motivations behind the decision: was it strategic urgency or a political and electoral calculation, both in Washington and in Tel Aviv?

1.3 The Stated Objectives and Their Contradictions

On February 28, after weeks of negotiations between Washington and Tehran under Omani auspices, the American and Israeli armed forces launched a massive strike campaign against Iran with the explicit aim of destroying its ballistic missile capabilities, annihilating the Iranian navy, preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, ensuring that the regime could not continue to arm, finance, or direct armed groups outside its borders, and bringing about its overthrow.

These objectives conceal deep internal tensions. Destroying the nuclear program is one thing—and even then, doubts remain about the capabilities still available in Iran’s underground arsenal. Overthrowing a 46-year-old regime that has developed structures of resistance, succession, and decentralized command is quite another. Iran responded to the attacks much more quickly than many observers expected, suggesting that a highly redundant continuity plan is indeed in place: multiple successions, pre-authorized strikes, and a decentralized chain of command in the event of the regime’s decapitation. The Assembly of Experts is meeting via videoconference to elect a new Supreme Leader, following the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the strikes. The regime is not a man.

Ongoing Transformations: Towards a Recomposition of the Regional Order

2.1 The Destruction of the Iranian Proxy Architecture

The first structural transformation concerns the axis of resistance. Even before the 2026 strikes, this axis had suffered considerable losses. Israeli strikes against Hezbollah had already killed 850 people on Lebanese soil. Hamas had been decimated in Gaza. The Houthis appear to be respecting their May 6, 2025 peace agreement with the United States. If the destruction of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities and the navy is confirmed, Tehran would be deprived of its main regional bargaining chip: a credible armed threat.

This dismantling of Iran’s proxy strategy creates a vacuum that could either be filled by local actors seeking to break free from regional control or generate new dynamics of instability. In Lebanon, the question is whether Hezbollah can survive as a political and military force without its Iranian patron. In Iraq, Shiite militias will have to redefine their position between a weakened Tehran and Baghdad, which is concerned about its sovereignty. In Yemen, does the peace agreement with the Houthis signal a lasting normalization or simply a respite?

2.2 The Realignment of the Gulf Arab Powers

The geography of the conflict reveals a fracture within the Arab world. The Gulf monarchies—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain—find themselves in an uncomfortable position: their territories host American bases that have been targeted by Iranian missiles, involuntarily exposing them to war. Explosions were heard in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai, Kuwait City, and Manama. Many airspaces in the region were closed, leading to a series of flight cancellations to the Middle East. The US embassy in Riyadh was targeted by drones; explosions caused a major fire within the diplomatic compound, but no injuries were reported.

This paradox is forcing the Gulf monarchies to undertake a profound strategic reassessment. Saudi Arabia, which had begun a discreet normalization process with Iran under Chinese auspices in 2023, sees this effort rendered meaningless. The United Arab Emirates, which had developed substantial economic ties with Tehran despite political tensions, are facing unprecedented pressure. Ultimately, if the Iranian regime falters or transforms, these countries will have to decide what kind of Iran they want as a neighbor: a weakened and fragmented Iran could generate as much instability as a powerful and hostile one. The Israeli-Arab normalization process, initiated with the 2020 Abraham Accords, is also on hold. Arab public opinion, mobilized by images of Gaza and now of bombed Tehran, is a constraint for leaders who sought to separate the Palestinian issue from their strategic interests. The current conflict makes this separation politically untenable in the short term.

2.3 The Question of Iran’s Future

Khamenei’s death constitutes an unprecedented political earthquake since the 1979 revolution. For forty-six years, he embodied the regime’s transcendent legitimacy—the wilayat al-faqih, the tutelage of the jurist-theologian. A significant number of key figures in power have been eliminated, including the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ali Khamenei, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, the Minister of Defense, Aziz Nasirzadeh, and his successor, Majid Ebnelreza. Iranian media also reported the deaths of the Supreme Leader’s daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter.

The scenarios are numerous. The first is that of resistance: the regime survives, becomes more radicalized, and the war drags on indefinitely. The second scenario is fragmentation: the central state collapses, the Revolutionary Guards splinter, and Iran enters a period of chaos similar to that experienced by Iraq or Libya after foreign interventions. The third—the one Washington and Tel Aviv hope for—is an orderly transition to a more moderate regime. Ali Larijani, a close ally of Khamenei whom Donald Trump seems to have chosen to stabilize the regime, is presented as pragmatic and diplomatic, capable of ensuring continuity of power while offering assurances to the United States. However, the experience of forced regime changes since 2001 suggests extreme caution regarding this last scenario. Iranian civil society, which has been demonstrating en masse since December 2025, finds itself in a precarious position. For many Iranians, foreign bombings do not liberate—they humiliate. The convergence between internal opposition and external military pressure is not automatic: it can just as easily turn into defensive nationalism, as evidenced by the history of foreign interventions in the Middle East.

2.4 Israel: Military Victory, Strategic Uncertainty

For Israel, the neutralization of the Iranian nuclear program and the dismantling of the resistance axis represent considerable strategic gains, objectives pursued for decades. According to a poll by the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 81% of the Israeli public supports the strikes against Iran, while 63% of respondents believe the campaign should continue until the regime falls.

But military victory does not resolve the fundamental political issues. The Palestinian question, far from being resolved by the destruction of Hamas and the weakening of Iran, would resurface in new forms. Israel’s international legitimacy, already severely damaged by the Gaza war, is once again being challenged by strikes that the United Nations and numerous states describe as violations of international law. The Israeli Prime Minister has every interest, for domestic political purposes, in prolonging the conflict as long as possible, with parliamentary elections approaching in October 2026.

Implications for the International Order

3.1 A Crisis of International Law and Multilateralism

Although the operation is supported by some regional allies, it has drawn condemnation from the United Nations and several states, which denounce it as a violation of international law and a destabilization of the Middle East. Legal criticisms have also emerged, deeming the strikes illegal under US domestic law and violations of Iranian sovereignty.

Europe is not entirely absent from the conflict. Several states have granted access to their bases for logistical or defensive support operations, particularly in the Gulf and Cyprus. Some governments, such as Spain, refuse any direct participation, while others, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, leave the door open to more active cooperation. The European Union has not activated its mutual military assistance clause. Giorgia Meloni’s statement—”this war is not ours”—aptly summarizes the predicament of allies caught between Atlantic solidarity and rejection of a conflict they did not want.

This normative crisis is all the more serious because, in a context of great power resurgence—where Russia is attacking Ukraine and China is projecting its power in the Indo-Pacific—the principles of sovereignty and non-aggression that underpin the UN order are being severely tested. The war against Iran reinforces the perception, particularly in the Global South, of a West with a flexible approach to international law.

3.2 Global Energy and Economic Stakes

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil production passes, has become a major point of contention. Iran is maintaining pressure in this strategic waterway and increasing its attacks against oil installations in the Gulf. The closure or partial blockade of the Strait would have immediate global economic consequences, with a surge in hydrocarbon prices that would primarily affect importing economies. Air travel disruptions are already significant: numerous regional airspaces have been closed, leading to a cascade of flight cancellations. Global supply chains, already weakened by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since 2023, are experiencing a further shockwave.

3.3 The Role of Non-Western Powers

In one year, Donald Trump ordered more airstrikes than Joe Biden did during his four years in office. The United States has bombed seven countries since Trump’s return to the White House—Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. This hyper-interventionist stance exposes Washington to increasing challenges to its legitimacy in the Global South.

China, which had carefully balanced its relations with Iran and its economic interests in the Gulf states, finds itself in a delicate position. Beijing condemns the strikes and calls for de-escalation, but its influence over the belligerents remains limited. Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, derives an indirect benefit from the American mobilization in the Middle East, which reduces Washington’s focus on Eastern Europe. These dynamics fuel the growing polarization between a Western bloc—whose legitimacy is increasingly challenged—and a group of revisionist powers that see each crisis as an opportunity to challenge American hegemony.

The Conflict Becomes a Quagmire: From Blitzkrieg to Strategic Trap

4.1 A Battlefield Extending Beyond Iran’s Borders

What was initially thought to be a short and surgical campaign quickly transformed into a conflict with multiple regional ramifications. Late in the day on March 1, Israel announced the launch of a new phase of massive attacks against Iranian missile launch sites. Hezbollah fired several rockets at northern Israel, drawing Israel into a simultaneous two-front war. Since Lebanon was drawn into the regional conflict, 826 people have been killed, including 106 children, and more than 830,000 have been displaced, according to authorities. The geography of the conflict expanded unexpectedly once again. An Iranian missile landed in Turkey, in Hatay province. Ankara asserted its right to self-defense, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that the alliance was committed to defending Turkey. Iran officially denied deliberately targeting Turkey, attributing the incident to a “technical anomaly.” The possible invocation of NATO Article 4 has become a focal point of urgent diplomatic discussions between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and his allies. The expansion of the conflict to a NATO member state constitutes a qualitative threshold whose implications could prove decisive for the future of the Atlantic alliance.

The war also reached the Indian Ocean. On March 4, 2026, the Iranian frigate Dena was sunk by a submarine attack off Galle, in the far south of Sri Lanka. The provisional death toll was at least 101 missing and 78 wounded among the 180 crew members. This was the first ship sunk by an American submarine since World War II. This singular feat illustrates both the global reach of the conflict and the American determination to eliminate any Iranian naval projection capability.

4.2 Iran Resists: Stockpiling Depletion and the Logic of a Protracted Conflict

Contrary to Trump’s hopes for a swift victory, Iran’s ballistic missile launch rate had decreased from the start of the war until March 4. Analysts point to a depletion of Iranian missile and launcher stocks, as well as a rationing strategy in preparation for a protracted conflict. On March 5, an Iranian military source indicated that Iran had launched more than 500 ballistic and naval missiles and nearly 2,000 drones since February 28. Nearly 40% of the attacks were directed toward Israel, and almost 60% toward American targets in the region.

Iran has carried out at least 7,171 strikes against Gulf states since February 28. The cost of the war is rising considerably for the belligerents: in the first 96 hours of the war alone, the Americans and Israelis reportedly spent the equivalent of more than a thousand precision weapons. Experts are questioning the ability to maintain this operational tempo in the event of a prolonged conflict. Furthermore, a fire aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford lasted more than 30 hours, according to sailors’ accounts—a duration far exceeding what the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) described in its official statement. More than 600 sailors have lost their bunks since the incident.

4.3 The Humanitarian and Heritage Dimension: A War with Civilizational Costs

Beyond military losses, the conflict is inflicting unique damage on Iran. UNESCO has warned of the damage caused to Iran’s cultural heritage: four of the 29 Iranian World Heritage sites have been hit by airstrikes. The Iranian Ministry of Cultural Heritage has reported damage to at least 56 museums and historical sites across Iran. In Tehran, the bombings damaged the Golestan Palace, a UNESCO World Heritage site sometimes compared to Versailles, and one of the oldest in the Iranian capital, in the first few days. In Isfahan, Naqsh-e-Jahan Square, a 17th-century architectural gem surrounded by mosques, a palace, and a historic bazaar, was among the sites damaged. These acts of destruction against national heritage fuel a narrative of national victimization that could unite Iranian society around the regime rather than turn it against it. Unprecedentedly large-scale demonstrations of mourning were organized to pay tribute to Khamenei. Videos show Isfahan’s main square completely filled with demonstrators chanting “Allahu Akbar.” Similar scenes were filmed in Tehran’s Revolution Square. The paradox is stark: in seeking to liberate the Iranian people, the strikes initially appear to rally them around their regime.

The Fault Lines of the International Community

5.1 NATO Divided, Europe Without a Compass

France will not participate in securing the Strait of Hormuz “in the current context” of the war in Iran, stated Emmanuel Macron. Donald Trump criticized the refusal of several NATO allies to respond positively to his request for assistance in securing this strategic waterway. This transatlantic rift is unprecedented in its form: Washington is demanding direct military participation from its allies in the name of a conflict they have explicitly refused to endorse. Emmanuel Macron has convened a new defense council on the situation in the Middle East, while Trump is pressuring France to respond positively to his request for assistance in securing the Strait of Hormuz, whose disrupted access poses risks to rising interest rates and French debt.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz called for an end to the war in the Middle East, stressing that it “benefited no one and was economically damaging to many,” while affirming that “all diplomatic channels” were being used. The E3, comprising the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, met to try to prevent further Iranian strikes, resolving to support, if necessary, “proportionate defensive military measures” against drones and ballistic missiles. This convoluted wording reflects a Europe attempting to reconcile its rejection of war with its need not to completely abandon its allies.

5.2 China, a reluctant actor

China is directly impacted by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: more than half of its seaborne crude oil imports come from the Middle East and transit primarily through this waterway. Beijing announced it would release $200,000 in humanitarian aid through the Red Cross Society of China, particularly after the explosion that killed more than 150 people, including many children, at a school in Minab, southern Iran. Symbolically modest given the scale of the crisis, this aid nevertheless marks the first concrete Chinese intervention since the start of the conflict.

5.3 The “Day After” Dilemma

On the 16th day of the war, Iran dismissed the idea of ​​negotiating with the United States, even though Donald Trump had stated that Tehran wanted to “reach an agreement.” Iran, through its Foreign Minister, asserted that it “sees no reason to negotiate.” The United States and Israel have repeatedly insisted that they intend to prolong the conflict for several more weeks, until all their objectives are achieved.

The question of “what happens next” is haunting the capitals. A transitional triumvirate composed of Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Parliament, and the head of the judiciary is managing day-to-day affairs in Iran, while the Assembly of Experts deliberates on the succession. Among the candidates being considered is Ali Khomeini, grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, who is married to the granddaughter of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This choice would allow for a revival of the revolutionary narrative by opting for a younger, more charismatic figure, while also benefiting from the dual religious legitimacy of the Shiite clergy in Iran and Iraq.

Does the war against Iran mark the beginning of a new Middle East? The answer is necessarily nuanced. Yes, in that the conflict is causing profound and likely irreversible ruptures: the death of Khamenei and the ensuing succession crisis; the structural weakening of the axis of resistance; The dismantling of the indirect confrontation paradigm that had prevailed since 1979; the first destruction of a warship by an American submarine since 1945; the involuntary involvement of a NATO member country in the conflict. These elements alter the fundamental dynamics of regional and global geopolitics.

But no, if by “new Middle East” we mean a stabilized order reconfigured on consensual grounds. What the war is currently producing is less a new order than increased disorder: an Iran in existential crisis with an unpredictable outcome; exposed and disoriented Arab Gulf powers; a militarily victorious but diplomatically isolated Israel; a NATO fractured by contradictory demands; a Europe adrift; an international community divided between power politics and the defense of international law. UNESCO reminds us that the preservation of heritage sites has been an international obligation since the 1954 Hague Convention—and their mass destruction adds a civilizational dimension to an already profoundly destabilizing war.

The history of the Middle East teaches us to be cautious about pronouncements of a clean slate. Regional realignments take time, generate unforeseen effects, and encounter resistance from societies and identities. The “regional cold war” between Sunnis and Shiites, between Arab nationalism and foreign influence, between democratic aspirations and persistent authoritarianism, cannot be resolved with bombs. The question of whether the current violence will give rise to order or lasting chaos remains, as of March 18, 2026, entirely open. The answer will depend less on the belligerents’ military capabilities than on their diplomatic wisdom—and this has proven a rare commodity in the region for several decades.

You can follow Professor Mohamed Chtatou on X: @Ayurinu

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