The Afghan data leak has generated a mass of lurid headlines and, no doubt, there is still much analysis, pointing of fingers and assigning of blame to come. But how did it happen that the UK ended up with such an obligation to so many thousands of Afghans and their families? I support the evacuation, but clarity of ends does not necessarily justify the means.

My assessment is that between 2014 and 2021 – when we, along with other Isaf nations, had moved from a combat to a support and capacity-building role – we took our eye off the ball. We accumulated liabilities but had no real mechanism to understand or control them. In this we were hampered by the particular feature of the UK’s capacity-building: our focus was not on the main bulk of the Afghan security forces but on specialist units such as counter-narcotic forces, police commandos and intelligence units. (They were often known by their ‘task force’ designation, TF 444, TF 222, etc, hence the common nickname ‘triples’.) 

The specialist units attracted the expertise and engagement of our special forces and intelligence agencies. They were highly successful, noted for their competence and effectiveness, and unlike the locally ‘employed’ civilians, of whom the interpreters are the best-known examples, the triples were employed by their Afghan ministries, not the British Armed Forces. The........

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