Russia’s military reputation in Africa was built in Kidal, Northern Mali. Late last month, it was buried in the same spot. The Russian flag that Wagner hoisted over Kidal in 2023 was up for less than 30 months when on 26 April an Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) fighter from the separatist rebel group allied with al-Qaeda’s Malian affiliate fashioned the tricolour into a turban decoration. This was the last thing Russian troops saw as they withdrew hastily from their base, one that until 24 hours prior had been held up as the model of Russian security force assistance in Africa.

The image of Bedouin rebels carrying Kalashnikovs while escorting Russian mercenaries out of their own base captures the significance of what happened across Mali late last month. In the largest coordinated offensive since 2012, al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM – a radical Islamist group seeking to topple the military junta and impose sharia law across the Sahel – launched simultaneous strikes on Malian military positions alongside their unlikely partners, the FLA.

This alliance of jihadists and secular Tuareg nationalists demonstrated that mutual hatred of Bamako’s oppressive rule proved stronger than ideological difference. They struck across Mali from the southern capital to the far north. Meanwhile, ‘Islamic State in the Sahel’ exploited the chaos to mount offensives and establish checkpoints of its own.

The Wagner group’s effectiveness rested on incentives that Africa Corps, by design, does not have

The Wagner group’s effectiveness rested on incentives that Africa Corps, by design, does not have

Mali’s defence minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed in a suicide bombing at his own home in the capital. The President, Assimi Goïta, was evacuated and silent for days. Russian and Malian forces in the north were surrounded and forced to negotiate their withdrawal to avoid being overrun. A full regime collapse in Bamako was narrowly prevented only by Russian mercenaries neutralising rebel........

© The Spectator