The failure of the Western strategy of Wandel durch Handel (German for “change through trade” with authoritarian powers) has led some political analysts to seize on engineering a second Sino-Soviet split in order to bring the Russian wolf back into the fold. For all Russia’s wrongs, they believe that Moscow distracts us from the real problem—Beijing—so they conclude that it would be better to cut a deal that pries Russia from its Chinese ally and frees American resources to counter the China challenge.

While Russia does chafe at its dependence on China, that does not make Russia ripe for picking. The seductiveness of a grand bargain belies several realities: the United States cannot pry Russia from China, the United States will not then “pivot to Asia” with freed-up resources, and those resources would be insufficient to deter or out-compete China. In the long run, this “reverse Nixon” strategy would only strengthen Russia and reflect a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the relationship between authoritarian regimes.

No “grand bargain” would pull Russia out of China’s orbit even if Putin accedes to such a pact. Not only is Putin uninterested in peaceful coexistence with Ukraine, but he would also have no compunction about cheating on whatever terms he agreed to. Russia has every incentive to do so.

While some of the Russian-Chinese trade agreements in food (e.g., wheat) and energy (oil, gas, coal) are more apparent than real or face future challenges, the long border between the two countries is conducive to connective infrastructure that will facilitate future trade. Additionally, China is Russia’s largest supplier of dual-use products that the United States and its allies have deemed “high priority” for Russian weapons production (e.g., semiconductors, telecoms equipment, machine tools), helping Russia bypass sanctions by exporting over $300 million per month of these controlled products. 

Dual-use products now

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