A group of soldiers walk under a placard displaying the logo of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command in Seoul, South Korea, in January 2012. The Combined Forces Command answers equally to the US and South Korean governments, although some politicians from both nations have incorrectly claimed that it cedes sovereignty to the other. (Department of Defense/Staff Sgt. Teddy Wade)

How Can America and South Korea Bridge the OPCON Gap?

Share this link on Facebook

Share this page on X (Twitter)

Share this link on LinkedIn

Share this page on Reddit

Email a link to this page

South Korea’s leaders are eager to assume “operational control,” or OPCON, over joint US-ROK forces in Korea as quickly as possible—but doing so would be a strategic mistake.

Despite long-standing bilateral agreements on the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces to a Seoul-led bilateral command, the United States and South Korea remain at odds over the timing and procedures for doing so. While Washington remains committed to the OPCON transition, it is concerned that the administration of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is overly eager to do so without first fulfilling agreed-upon requirements.

Lee perceives having his nation’s military forces under the control of a foreign general as an affront, and he (incorrectly) depicts reclaiming OPCON as a matter of South Korean national sovereignty. He has expressed a desire to attain OPCON transition before the end of his term in 2030. Such a move would run counter to the 2015 bilateral agreement that puts three preconditions in place before such a transition can occur: Seoul’s development of the capability to lead the combined US-South Korean forces Combined Forces Command (CFC); its acquisition of sufficient indigenous offensive and defensive capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats; and a broader improvement in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula due to complete or significant North Korean denuclearization.  

Lee’s mischaracterization reflects a flawed understanding of the current and future status of wartime OPCON. After the transition is completed as intended, the CFC commander would be a South Korean general, with a US general as deputy commander—the inverse of its current structure.........

© The National Interest