With the weather turning mild, an upsurge in terrorist attacks is noticeable. On the night of February 21, Pakistan launched intelligence-based airstrikes on seven terrorist camps and hideouts belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State–Khorasan Province, situated in three eastern provinces of Afghanistan — Nangarhar, Paktika and Khost. Reportedly, the strikes claimed the lives of more than 80 terrorists.

Pakistan was compelled to act in retaliation against groups considered responsible for suicide bombings that claimed the lives of security personnel, including Lt Colonel Shahzada Gul Faraz. The suicide attack was targeted, in which a bomber rammed his explosive-laden motorcycle into the vehicle of security officials in district Bannu on February 21.

It appears that the conflict is outpacing the National Action Plan (NAP), which embodies the counter-terrorism campaign Azm-i-Istehkam. In the face of the onslaught, the NAP seems to be shrinking in scope. While several critics claim that the NAP is not being followed in letter and spirit, the reality may be that the spate of terrorism is spiralling upwards.

Launched in June 2024, Operation Azm-i-Istehkam (resolve for stability) included not only military action to stamp out extremism but also socio-economic uplift to counter radicalisation. Of these, the military action is ongoing; however, measures for socio-economic uplift in areas ravaged by terrorism are missing. This suggests that by ignoring the root causes, the government is pursuing solutions alone.

Operation Azm-i-Istehkam is the seventeenth in a series of similar military campaigns that Pakistan’s armed forces have launched since 2002. These campaigns were aimed at neutralising the threat of Islamist insurgency that penetrated the northern and western parts of the country in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. However, unlike the previous sixteen campaigns, the latest operation extends beyond Pakistan’s borders to include Afghanistan within its scope.

In this ongoing seventeenth campaign, Pakistan has recognised that while the TTP — depicted as Fitna-ul Khawarij — has been pushed out of its territory, it continues to find refuge in Afghanistan. A new phase has thus begun. The interim government in Afghanistan appears unwilling to rein in the TTP, which persists in launching attacks on Pakistani soil.

If current trends are any indication, the conflict between Pakistan and the TTP is bound to enter another phase. With the approach of spring, the TTP has been intensifying its efforts. While Operation Azm-i-Istehkam focuses on the north-west, the south-west appears to be off the radar. In the context of ethnic nationalism, Balochistan is also simmering. Reportedly, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has seized seven Pakistan Army soldiers, presenting a new challenge across the vast swathes of the province. It is also possible that the abducted soldiers have been taken outside Pakistan’s borders.

Apparently, both the TTP and the BLA are exchanging tactics. In 2025, the TTP initiated around 500 drone attacks on positions — mostly check posts and police stations — of Pakistan’s security forces, reportedly using China-made quadcopters. Recently, the BLA has replicated similar tactics in Balochistan, employing drones for surveillance and reconnaissance. Technology has thus crept decisively into the conflict.

Secondly, the BLA has used female suicide bombers to pursue its objectives. Media reports suggest that the TTP may be following suit. A few days ago, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) arrested a suspected female suicide bomber in Dera Ismail Khan. The CTD is now burdened with the additional task of identifying and apprehending women prepared to carry out attacks for the TTP. This trend may not gain widespread traction in the conservative areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Thirdly, intelligence leaks remain a major source of strength for both the TTP and the BLA, as compromised information facilitates terrorist operations.

There is yet another dimension to the issue. Cross-border incursions in hot pursuit, bordering on retributive action, raise concerns under international law and norms. While clauses of the Doha Agreement — which obligate Kabul to deny the use of its soil against other countries — favour Pakistan, Afghanistan could still approach the UN Security Council. In such a scenario, Pakistan would be required to present concrete evidence of Afghan involvement, while Kabul may cite insufficient resources to effectively monitor the Pak-Afghan border.

Pakistan must exercise caution on two counts. First, under the United Nations Charter, particularly Article 2(4), member states are prohibited from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. The sole exception lies in Article 51, which recognises the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. Pakistan may justify its airstrikes under this provision, arguing that they are retaliatory rather than pre-emptive. However, the definitional distinction between an “armed attack” launched by a state and one carried out by a non-state militant group complicates the interpretation of this article.

Second, Pakistan’s strategy of targeting militant camps inside Afghanistan carries the risk of blowback, particularly in the event of collateral damage and civilian casualties. The loss of civilian lives may not necessarily weaken Kabul, but it could fuel anti-Pakistan sentiment among the Afghan population. Therefore, Pakistan must weigh its options carefully.

Dr. Tehmina Aslam RanjhaThe writer is an analyst on National Security and Counter-Terrorism. She tweets @TA_Ranjha and can be reached at taranjha1@gmail.com

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