This article was originally published by the International Institue for Strategic Studies.

The fifth year of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine has begun. It is Russia’s longest continuous major war since the 18th century (the 1979-89 Soviet war in Afghanistan was a sideshow in terms of tempo and casualties by comparison). It is also one of the longest wars between neighbors globally since 1945. In 2025, Russia gained less than 1% of Ukrainian territory and lost over 416,000 troops. Given the length, cost and stasis of the war, how likely is it to end soon?

The driver of the war has not changed over the past four years. Russia seeks to subordinate Ukraine, which Kyiv is determined to resist. These positions remain incompatible. Both states are materially capable of continuing to fight and judge the costs politically tolerable. The war will end only if Russia wins it or accepts that it cannot win. It cannot currently do the first and refuses to do the second. Since it will not scale back its goals, it must scale up the resources it commits to them. This is a strategy of attrition: generating sustained, superior mass and firepower to grind down an enemy. It is the opposite strategy to the initial invasion plan to seize Kyiv in days. Mass has replaced speed.

In an attritional war, the side with more blood and treasure usually wins, where commitment remains equal. But though Russia’s population is over three times larger than Ukraine’s — and its economy over ten times larger — its attrition has so far failed. Ukraine’s remarkable ingenuity and resilience cannot alone explain this, for Russia has the resources to convert into superior mass. Yet so far Moscow has mobilized only........

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