On Monday, President Trump announced that representatives from Washington and Tehran will meet this Saturday to discuss a potential deal over Iran’s nuclear capabilities and that Iran would be in “great danger” if a deal isn’t struck.

Yet Trump’s previous threats to bomb Iran have hindered the administration’s chances of getting the deal it wants. At first glance, the concept behind Trump’s threats toward Tehran seems simple enough: If a country doesn’t do a given action, the alternative will be much more painful. Unfortunately for the Trump administration, this logic is equivalent to the strategies of gaming aficionados in Risk or Civilization VI.

The subject of war and peace is a complicated one. Dealing with Iran is no exception.

An enemy’s perception of threats is important for deterrence to work. Several factors reduce the credibility of Trump’s threats to bomb Iran, and Tehran is likely aware of them. Ultimately, the administration is almost certain to fail to stop Iran from getting the bomb.

Trump seems to be relying on the concept of “madman theory” to coerce Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This theory calls for the threat issuer to make himself seem irrational and unpredictable, with the goal being to instill fear into the minds of the opposing side, making it concede to the threatening party’s demands.

At first glance, the madman theory seems to follow the logic of coercion, with its use of threats to manipulate an enemy’s behavior. But on further inspection, using madman behavior is a poor bargaining approach in international politics. The madman’s........

© The Hill